

# **Manuale Thomistarum**

**Seu Totius Theologiae  
Brevis Cursus**

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## CHAPTER IV

### *On the Efficacy of the Divine Will*

For the efficacy of the divine will to be perfectly understood, two celebrated controversies must be resolved here. The first exists between the Thomists and defenders of middle knowledge, namely whether the divine decrees concerning our free acts are intrinsically efficacious and predetermining the will, or purely indifferent and awaiting the determination and consent of the will? The second is against Jansen and his followers, namely whether the efficacy and predetermination of divine decrees has place not only for the state of fallen nature, but also extends to the state of innocence of Angels and men?

#### § I.

##### *The divine decrees of the will concerning our free acts are intrinsically efficacious and predetermining the will.*

This is proved first from Scripture, for the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4: "That none of you be puffed up beyond what is written, one against another: for who makes you to differ? What do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?" From these words this argument can be derived: If the divine decree concerning our free acts is not intrinsically efficacious and predetermining the human will, but purely indifferent and determinable by it to the species of act, there will be no reason for discerning the one who consents from the one who does not consent, but such difference will be reduced to the created will, and consequently one man will be able to be puffed up and glory against another: But this contradicts the words of the Apostle: Therefore not the former. The consequence of the major is proved: the difference of effect must be reduced not to that in which the causes agree, but to that in which they differ; for since two individuals of the same species agree in specific nature, and two species in generic grade, they cannot be discerned or distinguished among themselves through that common reason, specific or generic: But the one who will consent and the one who will not consent agree in the decree, insofar as it is from God and is purely indifferent, and differ only in respect of the consent and dissent of free will, determining the indifference and potentiality of such a decree to acts of diverse species: Therefore not to the divine decree, but to free will is reduced the discretion or difference of the one who consents from the one who does not consent.

This is proved secondly from the Holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that this question, why efficacious grace and calling is given to one and not to another, is entirely inscrutable and impenetrable, and cannot be solved through the willing or not willing of human will. Thus St. Prosper in "On the Calling of the Nations" book 1,

final chapter, where he says: "Therefore the profundity of that question, which according to the Apostle's admiration we confess to be impenetrable, is not solved by the willing or not willing of free will, because although evil willing is inherent in man, nevertheless he does not have good willing unless it has been given." Similarly Augustine solves the profundity of this question in no other way than by recurring to the inscrutable judgments of God, as is clear from tract 26 on John, where he says: "Why he draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." And in "On the Spirit and the Letter" chapter 33: "If anyone asks me why one is so persuaded that he is convinced, but another is not (that is, why efficacious calling is given to one and not to another), only two things occur which I am pleased to respond: O the depth of riches! and is there unrighteousness with God? To whom this response does not please, let him seek one more learned than Augustine, but let him beware lest he find one more presumptuous." But if God had a purely indifferent decree concerning our free acts and awaiting the determination and consent of free will determining it to the species of act, the solution of that question would be easy, for it could easily be responded (just as the Adversaries themselves respond) that therefore calling is efficacious in one and not in another, because one wills to comply with it and is foreseen through middle knowledge as about to consent, but not the other; or because one through free will determines the indifference of the divine decree to an act of such species, but not the other. Just as to one inquiring why the Sun with the fig tree produces figs, with the olive olives, with the vine clusters, it is easily responded that because the concurrence of the Sun, indifferent and indeterminate of itself, is modified in the inferior causes in which it is received, and is determined by them to produce these effects rather than those: Therefore the decrees of God concerning our free acts are not purely indifferent, but determining and intrinsically efficacious.

This is proved thirdly from St. Augustine, who in various places openly favors our opinion; in tract 105 on John he says that God predestined all future things, that is, predefined them. And in tract 68: "God made things future by predestining them." And in "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 10: "By his predestination God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do": But God cannot in his predestination or decree foreknow our future acts unless such a decree is efficacious of itself and causing the free determination of our will, and consequently predetermining it, as was shown in the treatise on the knowledge of God chapter 4 § 2: Therefore St. Augustine acknowledges in God decrees concerning our free acts that are efficacious of themselves and predetermining our will. This can be confirmed from the fact that the Holy Doctor in many places acknowledges grace as intrinsically efficacious, by which God converts the hearts of men when he wills, how he wills, and where he wills, as is clear especially from the book "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 8, where he says: "This grace therefore (namely efficacious grace) which is

secretly bestowed on human hearts by divine largesse, is rejected by no hard heart, for it is bestowed precisely so that the hardness of heart may first be taken away." But once intrinsically efficacious and infallible grace is admitted, as it comes from God, a decree that is efficacious of itself and intrinsically and predetermining the will must necessarily be conceded; as the Adversaries confess, and it is manifest of itself. Therefore decrees that are intrinsically and by their own nature efficacious are according to the mind of Augustine.

This is proved fourthly from St. Thomas, who also in many places manifestly teaches our opinion. For in Quodlibet 12 article 4 he subscribes to the opinion of those who say that all things are predetermined by God's providence, and in this sense he there teaches, with Augustine, that it can be conceded that all things are subject to fate, provided that by the name of fate we understand divine providence, preordaining and predetermining all things that happen in the world. He adds however that this name "fate" should not be used by Catholics, because it is not fitting to have names in common with the Gentiles. But who would say that purely indifferent decrees, or those supposing foresight of our consent through middle knowledge, can be called by the name of fate, and who would dare to assert that through such decrees all things are predetermined by divine providence, as the Holy Doctor speaks? No one therefore can deny that he acknowledges in God decrees intrinsically efficacious by which he predetermines our will to operate freely and simultaneously infallibly, both as to the substance of the act and the mode of freedom, as will be declared below. Hence in this part question 23 article 1 ad 1, solving an argument from the authority of Damascene saying: "God indeed foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things," he responds that "Damascene calls predetermination the imposition of necessity, as in natural things, which are predetermined to one." In the same way he responds to this authority and to another of Gregory of Nyssa in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 90. He thinks therefore that a decree predetermining the will, not to one through the mode of nature, but through the mode of freedom, with complete infallibility, must necessarily be admitted; otherwise he would have explained those authorities of the Fathers in vain, indeed he should not have interpreted them, but should have admitted them simply and absolutely.

From these things it is clear how much those recent authors have erred and been mistaken in the Doctrine of St. Thomas, who say that the name of predetermination is new and devised by Báñez; since the Holy Doctor not only uses it in the cited places, but also in 1 Sentences distinction 47 question unique article 4 ad 4, where he says: "By the will of God things are not only produced in being, but also in things to be produced he predetermined the motion by which they are produced. Hence since the will of God is efficaciously fulfilled, it is necessary that things happen, and in the same way, just as the divine will has disposed." Indeed Dionysius, disciple of Paul and

most ancient of theologians at the very beginning of the nascent Church, used the same name in chapter 5 "On the Divine Names," where he writes: "We call exemplars in God the substantial reasons which theologians call predefinitions and divine and good wills, predeterminative of existing things."

This is proved fifthly: If the decrees of the divine will concerning our free acts are not efficacious of themselves, but purely indifferent, it follows that the free determination of our will to consent to divine grace and calling is not caused by the divine will, and consequently that God is not the first cause of all things, nor consequently God. The consequence is proved: The will of God cannot cause such determination except through its decree, since according to the Apostle he works all things according to the counsel of his will: But through a decree indifferent of itself to consent or dissent, determination to consent rather than to dissent cannot be caused; for since the determinate and indifferent are equally opposed to each other, like hot and cold, white and black, just as it contradicts for hot to be produced by cold, or white by black, so also the determinate by the indifferent: Therefore if the decree of the divine will concerning our free acts is not efficacious of itself and predetermining, the determination of the human will will not be caused by the divine will.

This reason is confirmed and more clearly illustrated. I ask the Adversaries, by what is a decree indifferent to consent or dissent determined to one part rather than to another, by God or by the creature? If by the creature: Therefore the concurrence of the creature precedes by nature the concurrence of God, since the determining as such must precede that which is determined, because as such it is compared to it as form; and consequently the concurrence of the creature necessarily escapes the causality of the divine decree under some formality. If by God: Therefore his decree first by nature determines the second cause, and consequently it is not purely indifferent, but predetermining, as the Thomists teach. Certainly either a process to infinity must be admitted in the determination of divine concurrence and decree, indifferent of themselves; or it must be conceded that there is some actual determination of the created will which is not caused by God; or finally it must be said that the decree of the divine will by which it is caused is determinate of itself, and thus efficacious for consent rather than dissent of our will. Hence John of St. Thomas excellently says that this difficulty is a deep abyss for the assertors of middle knowledge, and full of most rapid whirlpools, which no one crosses whom it does not absorb, unless divine efficacy casts him to shore.

This is proved sixthly: If God has purely indifferent decrees concerning our free acts and awaiting the determination and consent of our will, it follows that he does not have as perfect and absolute dominion over our free acts as the created will: But this cannot be said, since according to Augustine in "On Corruption and Grace" chapter

14, God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own: Therefore neither the former. The consequence of the major is proved: The created will, by reason of the perfect dominion it has over its free acts, can with its freedom unharmed and intact, freely determine itself and begin such determination, nor must it suppose or await it from another created cause: Therefore if God cannot do the same and act without injury to freedom, so that such determination begins and proceeds from the created will, but must await it from free will and as it were beg it, he will not have as perfect and absolute dominion over our free acts as the created will itself, and man will have his will more in his hand than God himself; which is contradictory to the proposition of St. Augustine, asserting that God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own.

This is proved seventhly: with intrinsically efficacious decrees and aids removed, the necessity of prayer, which is the principal basis and foundation of spiritual and Christian life, utterly collapses, and all our prayer becomes entirely vain and derisory. For what, I ask, do the assertors of indifferent decrees and middle knowledge seek from God when they request God's grace for living well and holily? For either they seek grace and aid; and this cannot be said, since according to them grace is present at every moment and is conferred on any obdurate persons whatsoever. Or do they seek the use and application of grace, or determination? And not this, since they want it not to spring from grace and God's decree, but to be awaited from the human will: But it is a derisory petition (says Augustine) when that is sought from him who is known not to give it, but with him not giving it to be in man's power: Therefore if God's aid becoming efficacious is in our power, and its efficacy depends only on the determination and application of our will, as the Adversaries teach, it is sought from God in vain; for God will respond to the petitioner: You make grace efficacious and you will have whatever you desire.

I add that the indifferent decree of concurring with free causes, which the Adversaries admit in God, has many difficulties which bite and sting them sharply, and from which they can hardly extricate themselves. For either that decree is general and absolute, of concurring to whatever man wills, as some of the defenders of middle knowledge teach; or special and conditional, namely I will to concur to love or hatred, if the creature wills and determines itself to love or hatred, as others assert? If the first is said, that mode of God's concurring through indifferent concurrence and without intention and volition of any particular act and effect, with only general intention of acting what the creature wills, will be blind, ignorant, imprudent, vague, and confused, and will make God similar to fishermen who cast nets into the sea, ignorant of what fish they will catch and enclose in their nets. If the second is asserted, such a decree will make a ridiculous and nugatory sense, since according to the Adversaries God's concurrence is nothing other than the action of the second cause as from God; for God

to say I will to concur to love if the creature determines itself to loving, is the same as saying I will to concur to love if I concur to love, or if I see love produced, I will produce it.

This is confirmed: It implies contradiction to promise or decree conditionally that without which such condition cannot be fulfilled; for if someone said to a man standing in darkness, if you see this object, I will provide you light, he would mock him, since he cannot see it without light. Similarly if someone said to a weak and impotent boy unable to lift some weight, if you lift it, I will help you to lift it, he would equally mock him, since he is impotent to lift it unless helped by another: But the created will in whatever order of things it is constituted cannot will or determine itself without God's actual concurrence, according to that of Augustine in the Soliloquies chapter 24: "I cannot will what is good unless you will": Therefore God's concurrence cannot be promised or decreed by God under the condition that the human will wills or determines itself.

Finally, indifferent decrees can be refuted by an argument taken from the new decree of Innocent XI of the following tenor.

Thursday, November 23, 1679.

In the general congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, held in the Apostolic Palace of Monte Quirinale, before our Most Holy Lord Innocent XI and the  
Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church,  
general Inquisitors throughout the Christian Republic against heretical pravity deputed  
by the Holy Apostolic See.

Since these two propositions were reported to the aforesaid Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords: "God gives us his Omnipotence so that we may use it, just as someone gives another a villa or book." And "God subjects his Omnipotence to us":

By their order they were diligently examined by theologians specially deputed for this; their votes having been heard, and the matter reported to our Most Holy Lord and proposed before his Holiness together with the votes of the same Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, his Holiness decreed and commanded that both propositions should be entirely prohibited, just as by the present decree he condemns and prohibits them as at least rash and novel, and commands that no one henceforth of whatever grade, order, or condition dare to print or cause to be printed, or teach or assert them either in writing or even orally, under the penalties and censures contained in the Index of prohibited books.

Place of the Seal. Francis Richard, notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition.

December 2, 1679. The aforesaid decree was posted and published at the doors of the Basilica of the Prince of the Apostles, of the Palace of the Holy Office and in other customary and usual places of the City by me Francis Perrino, courier of our Most Holy Lord the Pope and of the Most Holy Inquisition.

By this decree the indifferent decrees of recent authors seem to be touched; for many of them everywhere teach and assert that men have God's Omnipotence and concurrence in their power, and use it at will, and determine it either to good or evil as it pleases them, and in this sense they understand and explain that of Isaiah 43: "You have made me serve in your sins." They add that God's concurrence emanating from divine Omnipotence is in us by way of habit, which we use when we will and as we will, and which is subjected to the freedom and judgment of our will. Hence the aforesaid decree seems to militate against such doctrine and opinion, and to condemn and reprove it as rash and novel. We must therefore stand by the ancient and true and solid doctrine of the Thomists asserting that God's Omnipotence and his decrees, aids and concurrence are not in our power, nor subjected to the judgment of our will, but rather powerfully and sweetly subject it to itself, and that they are efficacious of themselves and intrinsically, therefore not determined by the created will to acting or not acting, but determining and applying it to whatever God wills, on account of the supreme and absolute dominion which he has over it, as we have declared at length above from Augustine.

## § II. *Objections are solved.*

You will object first: The concurrence of universal and superior causes is indifferent and is determined by particular and inferior causes to the species of act: e.g., the concurrence of the Sun is determined by the fig tree to produce figs, by the olive to produce olives, by the vine to produce clusters, by man to generate man, by horse to produce horse: Therefore similarly the decree or concurrence of the first and most universal cause is indifferent and is determined by free causes to the species of act. Hence St. Thomas in question 1 "On Power" article 4 ad 3 teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified, determined, and specified by second causes.

I respond, the antecedent being conceded, by denying the consequence and parity: The reason for the difference is that the concurrence of universal second causes should not cause the determination of inferior causes as to the species of their acts or effects: e.g., the Sun does not cause the determination of a plant or tree to produce fruits of such

species, but supposes it implanted by nature. But the concurrence of the first cause, since it is most universal and extends to all things, causes the determination of free will, and does not suppose or await it from the created will, hence it cannot be indifferent like the concurrence of universal second causes. When St. Thomas teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified and determined by second causes, he only intends that God tempers and accommodates his concurrence and his motion to their natures; so that he moves necessary and natural causes to one through the mode of nature, not leaving power to the opposite, but free ones to one through the mode of freedom and leaving power to the opposite, which is for God's concurrence and motion to be determined by second causes only materially and objectively or, as others speak, exigitively.

You will object secondly: St. Thomas in question 6 "On Truth" article 3 teaches that God prepares for the salvation of the predestined means which are indeed defectible of themselves, but some of which, with others failing, are going to have effect: just as (he says) the perpetuity of the species is preserved through the succession of many individuals, each of which is corruptible: But if there were given an intrinsically efficacious decree predetermining the will, each aid of grace in the predestined would have efficacy and effect: Therefore such a decree contradicts the mind and doctrine of St. Thomas.

I respond that the Holy Doctor there speaks of free will compared with the end of predestination, for attaining which it is most true that there is not efficacy in each particular aid, but in the whole collection by which God prepares from efficacious intention of glory; but he does not deny that each aid of divine grace has intrinsic efficacy for the act in particular for which it is given, but rather teaches the opposite, as is gathered from the example he adduces; for if in each individual of corruptible nature there were not efficacy for some conservation of nature, perpetuity could not be preserved even in all individuals: Therefore likewise, unless in some aids there were efficacy of grace for particular acts by which one arrives at beatitude, the attainment of the end could not be had through them.

The Adversaries object thirdly: From intrinsically efficacious decrees predetermining the created will, fate is introduced into human affairs, since such decrees are no less firm, inflexible, and immutable than the constellations of stars and courses of planets in which the pagans formerly established fate. Hence Lessius calls those decrees iron and adamantine: Therefore they are not to be admitted.

I respond first that the same was formerly objected to Augustine by the Semipelagians, as is clear from St. Prosper in his letter to Augustine, where relating the principal complaints of the Massilienses against his doctrine, he says that they

complained that some fatal necessity was introduced from his doctrine. Hence Faustus, leader of the Semipelagians, in book 10 "On Free Will" chapter 4, attacking Augustine's doctrine while suppressing his name, says: "Under the front of piety, the evil of paganism, and under the term of grace, will be hidden a fatal decree." And chapter 12: "Let the original or fatal definition depart hence."

I respond secondly that if by the name of fate is understood divine providence, predefining and predetermining by its eternal and immutable decree all things that happen in the world to occur according to the nature and condition of the causes from which they proceed, that is, free things freely and necessary things necessarily, there is no inconvenience in admitting fate, although we should not use this name because it is not fitting for Catholics to have names in common with the Gentiles. For thus St. Thomas expressly teaches in Quodlibet 12 cited above, and proves from Augustine saying: "If anyone understands fate in this way, let him hold the opinion, correct his language, and not say fate, but God's providence." Augustine has similar things in book 2 "Against Two Letters of the Pelagians," where he writes: "Nor do we assert fate under the name of grace, because we say that God's grace is preceded by no human merits; but if it pleases some to call God's most omnipotent will by the name of fate, we indeed avoid profane novelties of words, but we do not love to contend about words."

Moreover, a great and notable difference is found between the predetermining decree and fate rigorously taken, which the Gentiles formerly admitted; for the latter was from causes entirely extrinsic to the will, namely from stars and celestial bodies: but the former proceeds from God, who since he is the author and principle of the will itself, and has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own, does not stand as something external needing in respect to our will, but is counted among its internal causes, as will be declared more broadly below. Hence although the fate of the Gentiles inferred necessity to the will and took away from it the power to the opposite, nevertheless the predetermining decree does not, which rather fosters, conserves, and strengthens such power, as will be clear from what will be said below. Hence the predetermining decrees are undeservedly called iron and adamantine by Lessius, since they are most sweet and proportioned and accommodated to the nature and condition of the second causes which they move. More truly indeed the indifferent decrees which the defenders of middle knowledge attribute to God could be called glassy and leaden; glassy indeed because, to use Augustine's words, they shine with vanity but are broken by truth: leaden moreover because they await sealing and determination from the human will.

### § III.

*God physically predetermines the will to elicit its free acts.*

This is proved first by a fundamental reason: Simultaneous concurrence does not preserve in God the nature of first cause with respect to our free acts: Therefore previous concurrence, which is called physical predetermination by the Thomists, must necessarily be admitted. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: Indifferent concurrence, as from God and to be determined by the will, does not suffice for the nature of first cause: But simultaneous concurrence is indifferent as from God and to be determined by the will, as the Adversaries teach: Therefore it does not suffice for the nature of first cause. The major is proved: concurrence in which God is more subordinated to the creature than the creature to God does not suffice for the nature of first cause: But in indifferent concurrence as from God and determined as from the will, God is more subordinated to the creature than the creature to God: Therefore such concurrence does not suffice for the nature of first cause. The major is clear, for it is against the perfection of the first cause to be subordinated to the second. The minor is shown thus: Because the created will cannot elicit a free act without divine concurrence, it is subordinated to God in the production of the free act, as the Adversaries teach: But God cannot cause a free act without the concurrence of the will, and otherwise the created will determines the divine concurrence if it is indifferent as from God, or offered in an indifferent manner to the will: Therefore in this mode of concurring, God is more subordinated to the will than the will to God.

From this you will understand that in order for the nature of first cause to be preserved in God in regard to free acts, he must concur to them with previous concurrence determining the concurrence of the created will. Both because every cause must be prior, at least by nature and causality, to its effect. And also because indifferent concurrence cannot cause the determination of our will, just as hot cannot be produced by cold, nor white by black. And finally because in order for God as first cause to influence the free consent of the created will, the created will must be subordinated to God in its production: But unless it depends on him as determining, it is not subordinated to him: Therefore neither does it depend on him as first cause. The minor is proved: That the created will cannot effect a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to be subordinated to God in its production: Therefore for this subordination to be preserved, it must depend on God as determining its concurrence. The consequence is clear, the antecedent is proved: God cannot effect a free act of the created will without its concurrence, and yet God is not subordinated to the created will in the production of the free act, for it is against the nature of the first cause to be subordinated to the second: Therefore that the created will cannot effect a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to elicit it as subordinated to God, nor consequently for God to concur to it as first cause.

The necessity of physical predetermination with respect to the created will is proved secondly by a reason taken from St. Thomas in 2 Physics lecture 8, where he argues

thus: "Just as a motive power which is to either alternative does not go into act unless the appetitive power is determined to one, so nothing that is to either alternative goes into act except through something determining it to one, because that which is to either alternative is like a being in potency, but potency is not a principle of acting, but only act; hence from that which is to either alternative nothing follows except through something else which determines to one." He has similar things in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 2, where he writes: "What indifferently relates to many things does not operate one thing more than another, hence from the contingent to either alternative no effect follows except through something by which it is determined to one." But the created will of itself is an indeterminate and indifferent principle to either alternative, and indifferently relates to many things: Therefore it will never go into determinate act unless it is first determined, at least by nature, by some extrinsic agent, namely God.

Suarez responds in book 3 "On Aids" chapters 42 and 43 that our will, although it is indifferent and in potency to its acts, nevertheless because of the eminence of its power and because of its freedom and perfect dominion which it has over its acts, is virtually in act, and therefore does not need to be determined and reduced to act by some extrinsic agent, but can determine itself and reduce itself to act.

But against this: Although the will by reason of its freedom has dominion over its acts, that dominion is nevertheless not supreme and absolute, but dependent on God's dominion and subordinated to it: Therefore although it can in its order and as second free and second mover determine itself and reduce itself to act, it nevertheless cannot do this except with subordination to the first free and first mover, and consequently except dependently on its motion and determination. Hence St. Thomas excellently says in 1-2 question 109 article 2 ad 1: "Man is master of his act of willing and not willing because of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one part or the other: But that he deliberates or does not deliberate, if he is also master of this sort of thing, it is necessary that this be through preceding deliberation, and since this does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary that finally one arrives at this, that the free will of man is moved by some exterior principle which is above the human mind, namely God."

You will say this only proves that the human will must be premoved and predetermined by God to the volition of good in general and the first intention of the end, from which it can afterwards move and determine itself to the election of means and volition of particular goods. Hence the same Holy Doctor in 1-2 question 9 article 6 ad 3 says: "God moves the will of man as universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is good, but man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparent good."

But against this: From an indifferent principle, as it is indifferent, a determinate act cannot proceed unless it is first determined by another, as St. Thomas says in the places related above; But with the first intention of the end posited and love of good in general, the will still remains indifferent to the election of this or that means and to the volition of this or that particular good: Therefore it still needs to be determined by God. Hence the Holy Doctor in the cited place only intends to establish a difference between God's motion in regard to good as such and in regard to particular goods, consisting in this that to the former he adequately applies and determines the will, with it only concurring elicitively but not applying and determining itself: but in regard to particular goods, the created will concurs not only elicitively but also applicatively, applying and determining itself, not indeed as first applying and determining, but as second and consequently under the motion, application, and predetermination of God as first mover, applier, and determiner. From which it does not follow that it is not predetermined by God to the volition of particular goods, but rather the opposite.

This is proved thirdly by a reason showing the necessity of physical predetermination in regard to supernatural acts: God through preventing grace truly and properly effects in us the determination of the will to good, e.g., to believing revealed mysteries or to loving God above all things: But he cannot do this except through physically predetermining grace; Therefore that must be admitted. The major is certain from faith and is clear from Trent session 6 chapter 7 defining that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from God's preventing grace: but such a beginning starts from the determination of free will by which the unbeliever determines himself to believe the mysteries revealed to him, or the believer to consent to his calling and to love God above all things. The minor, in which is the difficulty, is shown thus: Moral motion is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical, and pertains more to the genus of final cause than efficient; for it moves only objectively and by exhibiting to the will goodness which by its suitability allures it: as is clear from the example of a boy who by the showing of an apple is morally moved and excited to running; for who would say that this moral excitation is truly and properly the efficient cause of his running? Therefore God through grace only morally exciting cannot truly and properly effect in us the determination of the will to good, but only through physically preventing and predetermining grace.

You will say: God causes such determination truly and properly in us through the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency, or through simultaneous concurrence of supernatural order, by which together with the will he influences its consent and determination.

But against this first: The cited Trent teaches that the beginning of our justification (and consequently the determination of the will to believe or love God above all things, from which the beginning of justification starts) proceeds from God's preventing grace: But the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency is not preventing but concomitant: Therefore the first beginning of our justification does not proceed from it.

Against this secondly: simultaneous concurrence, according to the principles of the Adversaries, is indifferent or offered in an indifferent manner to the will: Therefore it is so far from truly and properly causing the determination of our will that it rather supposes or awaits it from the will, so that God may determinately influence our free acts, or so that the indifference, suspension, and indetermination of the divine decree may be removed and resolved, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section.

#### § IV.

##### *Physical predetermination is according to the mind of St. Thomas.*

This is proved first: With the predetermining decree admitted, physical predetermination cannot be denied, since that is the execution and causality of such a decree, and flows from it as a ray from the Sun, a stream from a spring, and an effect from a cause: But St. Thomas admits the predetermining decree, since he asserts in Quodlibet 12 article 4 that all things are predetermined by divine providence, as is clear from what was said in § 1: Therefore also physical predetermination.

This is proved secondly: Previous concurrence and physical predetermination mean the same thing: But St. Thomas admits previous concurrence: Therefore also physical predetermination. The major is clear. The minor is proved from St. Thomas in question 3 "On Power" article 7 ad 3, where he says: "In the operation by which God operates by moving nature, nature does not operate, but the very operation of nature is also the operation of divine power." By these words the Holy Doctor expressly distinguishes in God a twofold concurrence; one which is from God alone, with nature not operating, which is therefore previous and precedes the operation of the second cause by priority at least of nature; another which is identified with the aforesaid operation, and this is simultaneous concurrence, which is the very operation of the second cause as it depends on God simultaneously influencing. Hence he adds there in response ad 4 that both God and nature operate immediately, although they are ordered according to before and after.

This is proved thirdly: By the name of physical predetermination, the Thomists understand nothing other than a certain flowing and passing power by which God moves and applies second causes to operating: But St. Thomas admitted such power;

Therefore also physical predetermination. The major is clear. The minor is proved from the cited place "On Power" in response ad 7, where the Holy Doctor writes: "The natural power which is conferred on natural things in their institution exists in them as a certain form having firm being, but that which is done by God in a natural thing so that it actually acts is like an intention alone, having a certain incomplete being, in the manner that colors are in air (namely in intentional being, by reason of the species which represent them) and the power of art in the instrument of the artificer." This testimony is so manifest that the Coimbrans in 2 Physics chapter 7 question 4 article 1 frankly confess that St. Thomas there admitted previous concurrence, moving and applying second causes to operating, which is the very physical premotion or predetermination which the Thomists admit. Their words are: "Concerning the mode by which God concurs with second causes to their operations and effects, the celebrated opinion of St. Thomas in question 7 'On Power' article 7 and of his followers, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and others, presents itself, thinking that all second causes, before they operate, receive from God a certain influx and motion, which is like the intentional being of divine power, by which they are excited to producing actions, in the manner that instruments of arts, like adzes and axes, receive previous motion from the craftsman when they are applied to completing work." Azorius has similar things in book 1 "Moral Institutions" chapter 21 question 8, where he writes: "Eighthly it is asked whether God, when he operates with nature or will, moves and applies it to acting? St. Thomas openly says yes; God not only gives forms to things but also conserves them and applies them. But the opinion of St. Thomas seems most true to me, for Augustine plainly seems to hand down this, etc." Likewise Pererius in book 8 "On Causes" chapter 8: "In that which St. Thomas adds, that second causes, and among these our will, are moved, applied, and determined by God to acting, although some theologians dissent: I nevertheless go very willingly with hands and feet into that opinion." Bellarmine writes similar things in book 4 "On Free Will" chapter 16: "Another reason for reconciling human freedom with divine cooperation, and perhaps also more probable, is according to the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches that divine cooperation concurs with second causes, even free ones, in such a way that he not only gave and conserves their operative powers, but also moves and applies them to work, as can be known from 1 part question 105 article 5, and book 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 70, and question 3 "On Power" article 7. This opinion is very consonant both with Scripture, which says that we live, move, and have our being in God, and also with reason and the order which the first cause has with second ones." Finally the booklet "On the Method of Studies," composed by six Fathers of the Society and printed at Rome in the College of the Society by order of the General Superior in the year 1586, which is handed down as a rule to all Readers of the Society, in § "On the Choice of Opinions in the Theological Faculty," says thus: "In Theology let our men follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, as is prescribed in the 4th

part of the constitutions chapter 14, except for a few things: And afterwards explaining what are those few things which they are not bound to follow, number 6 among others counts this opinion of St. Thomas: "That second causes are properly and univocally instruments of God, and when they operate, he first influences into them or moves them." I have transcribed these word for word from the exemplar of this book of the 1586 edition which is preserved in our convent at Toulouse. Hence it is wonderful that some Fathers of the Society have dared to deny that these things are contained in such a book. These testimonies openly demonstrate that previous concurrence by which God moves and applies second causes to acting is according to the mind of St. Thomas, with firm (as Novatian says chapter 8 "On the Trinity") being the kind of proof which is taken from adversaries, so that truth is proved even by the enemies of truth.

This is proved fourthly: According to St. Thomas, God physically moves all second causes: Therefore he also physically premoves and predetermines them. The antecedent is clear from 1 part question 105 article 5, from the first part of the second part question 109 article 1, from book 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 70, and from question 3 "On Power" article 7, where he teaches that God moves all second causes to their operations; this cannot be understood of moral motion (since natural causes, as lacking reason, are not capable of it) but only of physical. The consequence is proved from the same Holy Doctor in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 149, where he says: "The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the mobile by reason and cause," that is, by priority of reason and causality. Which doctrine he took from Aristotle in 4 Metaphysics text 21, saying: "The mover is by nature prior to the moved": Therefore if God physically moves all second causes to operating, he physically premoves them.

This is proved fifthly: Motion that is intrinsically efficacious, with which dissent cannot be combined, is physically predetermining: But St. Thomas admits such motion, Therefore also physically predetermining motion. The major is clear, the minor is proved from the same Holy Doctor in 2-2 question 24 article 11, where he says: "The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly works whatever he wills; hence it is impossible for these two things to be true simultaneously, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he loses charity by sinning." And in 1-2 question 10 article 4 ad 3: "If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to suppose that the will is not moved to that."

## § V. *Objections are solved.*

The Adversaries object first: St. Thomas in 2 Sentences distinction 39 question 1 article 1 in the body says: "The very power of the will, as far as it is in itself, is

indifferent to many things, but that it determinately proceeds to this act or that is not from another determining" (or as some manuscript codices have, "is not from another determiner") "but from the will itself": Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the will is not predetermined by God.

I respond with the learned Father Nicolai, in a marginal note to this place, that the Holy Doctor there only denies that in order for the will to proceed determinately to this or that act, it is not from another created determiner, natural, pertaining to the same genus or the same order; but he does not exclude its being from God as first agent, determining the created will subordinated to him, with determination conforming to its connatural exigency, that is, not necessitating but effecting that it act infallibly freely.

From this you will easily understand another testimony of St. Thomas, taken from question 3 "On Evil" article 3 ad 5, where he says: "Since the will is to either alternative, it is determined to one by something, namely by the counsel of reason, nor is it necessary for this to be by some extrinsic agent." For the Holy Doctor by these words only intends to exclude a created extrinsic agent, but not an uncreated agent, which is the author and cause of the will itself and its motion. For he always excepts this, as is clear from book 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 88, from 1 part question 83 article 1 ad 3, and question 105 article 4 ad 1 and 2, and from question 22 "On Truth" article 9, where he says: "On the part of the will, that which operates within the will cannot change the act of the will, and this is the will itself and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to faith is God alone." Scotus teaches the same in 4 Sentences distinction 49 question 6 § "I say therefore," where he says: "It is against the nature of the will to be determined by an inferior cause, because by this very fact it would not be superior; but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, namely God."

The Adversaries object secondly two testimonies of St. Thomas taken from book 2 Sentences. The first is found in distinction 24 question 1 article 1 ad 3, where he says: "The determination of action and end is established in the power of free will, hence dominion over its act remains to it, although not as to the first agent." The other in distinction 28 question 1 article 1, where he writes: "Man would not be of free will unless the determination of his work pertained to him, so that by his own judgment he might choose this or that."

But these do not even lightly touch physical predetermination. For in the first place the Holy Doctor only intends that election and determination of action is in the power of free will as second free and second determiner, and therefore does not exclude subordination and dependence on the motion and determination of the first free, but

rather includes it. Therefore he adds: "although not as to the first agent." These last words openly declare that the determination of our will is not so in its power that it does not also descend from God's supreme power causing it; because the dominion which the will has over its acts is not supreme, like that which belongs to the first agent. Hence the same Holy Doctor in question 3 "On Power" article 7 ad 13: "The will is said to have dominion over its act, not by exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not so act on the will as to determine it of necessity to one, as it determines nature, and therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and will." From this is clear the response to the second testimony; for St. Thomas only intends that man would not be of free will unless the determination of his work pertained to him as to the second free and second determiner, and unless he had dominion over his acts, yet subjected and subordinated to God's supreme dominion, who, as Augustine says, has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own.

They object thirdly: St. Thomas in Quodlibet 1 article 7 ad 2 says: "Thus God moves the human mind to good, yet it can resist this motion": But if divine motion physically predetermined the human will to good work, the will could not resist it: Therefore St. Thomas thinks that God does not physically predetermine the human will.

I respond by denying the consequence of the minor, for the will can resist any divine motion or dissent, with this difference however, that from motion that is purely exciting and providing only sufficient aid, it can resist or dissent both in the composite and divided sense, or by antecedent and consequent power; indeed the will actually resists this motion and rejects it and deprives it of the effect to which it is principally and ultimately ordered: but from motion that is physically predetermining and providing efficacious aid, the will never actually resists, for that (as Augustine says) is rejected by no hard heart, for it is bestowed precisely so that the hardness of heart may first be taken away: yet it can resist it in the divided sense and by antecedent power, but not in the composite sense and by consequent power: Hence St. Thomas in 1-2 question 10 article 4 ad 3: "If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to suppose that the will is not moved to that, yet it is not impossible simply." Nor does it avail if you say that if the will can resist divine motion in the divided sense or by antecedent power, it will be able to frustrate it of its effect and render it vain and ineffectual. For the efficacy of such motion consists in this, that it leaves in man the power of resisting it and confers an unconquered will not to resist. Hence St. Thomas here in question 19 article 8 ad 2: "From this very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only do those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen contingently or necessarily, because he wills them to happen thus."

Other testimonies of St. Thomas which Peter of St. Joseph of Fulda objects to us in the booklet which he calls "The Defense of St. Thomas" are entirely without difficulty and have been explained by us in "The Shield of Thomistic Theology," treatise "On Human Acts" disputation 6 article 2 § 13 and following, hence we omit them here lest we cause tedium to the reader.

## § VI.

### *The harmony of created freedom with the predetermining decree and physical predetermination.*

There are three most difficult and obscure harmonies which can deservedly be called three most sacred enigmas: namely the harmony of God's freedom with his immutability; the harmony of Christ's freedom with his impeccability; and the harmony of man's freedom with the efficacy of grace and the divine will. Hence Augustine in the book "On the Grace of Christ" chapter 47: "This question where free will of the will and God's grace is disputed is so difficult to discern that when free will is defended, God's grace seems to be denied; when God's grace is asserted, free will is thought to be taken away." And in book 2 "Against the Letters of Petilian": "If I propose to you the question how God the Father draws to the Son men whom he left in free will, perhaps you will solve it with difficulty: for how does he draw if he allows each to choose what he wills? And yet both are true, but few are able to penetrate this with understanding." But so that the bond or glue by which these things are connected and coupled among themselves may be explained in some way, he will give it who, as Jacob says, makes harmony in the heights.

It must therefore be observed with St. Thomas in 1 "On Interpretation" lecture 14 that there is a twofold root of our freedom. The first is extrinsic and existing in God, namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will, reaching the substance and mode in our operations, as the same Holy Doctor declares at length here in question 19 article 8 with these words: "Since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen in the manner in which God wills them to happen, etc." Likewise in 2 Sentences distinction 47 unique question article 4 he says: "Since the will of God is efficaciously fulfilled, it is necessary that things happen, and that they happen in the same way as the divine will has disposed."

St. Peter had used the same mode of reconciling freedom much earlier, who to Simon Magus denying free will because, he said, what God wills to be is and what he wills not to be is not, responded, as Clement of Rome relates in book 3 "Recognitions" at the beginning: "You are ignorant, Simon, and very ignorant of how the will of God is in each and every thing. For some things he willed to be so that they could not be

other than what they were instituted by him, and for these he established neither rewards nor punishments. But those things which he willed to be so that they have in their power to do what they will, for these he established according to their acts and wills that they either merit remunerations or punishments." By these words the Apostle refers necessity and contingency and created freedom to the efficacy of the divine will as to the first principle and first root of it.

The second root of created freedom is intrinsic to man and residing in him, namely the objective indifference of judgment, as St. Thomas declares in various places, for in 1 part question 83 article 1 he says: "Because the judgment of reason relates to diverse things and is not determined to one, it is necessary that man be of free will." And in 1-2 question 17 article 1 ad 2: "From this the will can be carried to diverse things, because reason can have diverse cognitions of good." Likewise in question 24 "On Truth" article 2 he expressly says that the entire root of freedom is established in reason. Reason also suggests this, since the will is rational appetite, following the cognition of the intellect and the direction of reason, it is impossible that it be necessarily carried to an object which is proposed to it as indifferent by the intellect.

From these things you will understand first by what reason neither the predetermining decree nor physical predetermination takes away or harms the freedom of our will; because both proceed from the first root of freedom and contingency, namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will, and both cause the proximate and intrinsic root of human freedom, namely the objective indifference of judgment; because before they apply the will to choosing or rejecting some object, they apply the intellect to forming an indifferent judgment of reason by which it represents such an object to the will as indifferent and as some particular good which it can choose or reject.

You will understand secondly how the predetermining decree and physical predetermination perfect the potential freedom of our will and cause the actual. For every motion which is accommodated to the nature of the subject which it moves perfects it; but the motion of the predetermining decree and physical predetermination is accommodated to the nature and condition of the created will, which since it is rational appetite, seeks to be moved to free acts under the objective indifference of judgment, which is the proximate root of freedom. I add that such motion reduces the potential freedom of our will from first to second act, and consequently takes away from it some imperfection and defect, namely potentiality and suspension, or lack of act: Therefore it perfects it.

That it causes its actual freedom is clear from what was said above; for the actual freedom of our will is nothing other than its free determination: But this is caused by the predetermining decree and physical predetermination, but not by an indifferent

decree or simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above: Therefore also the actual freedom of our will, which consequently, with such decree and predetermination removed, is entirely taken away, since with the cause removed, the effect cannot stand.

You will object first: It is of the nature of a free cause to determine itself to whatever it wills: Therefore if the created will is predetermined by God, it will not be free.

I respond that just as it is not of the nature of an efficient cause that it be first, but that its effect, although it may be moved by another prior one, as is clear in fire and heaven; so it is not of the nature of a free cause that it determine itself first, but that it determine itself according to its nature; so that if it were the first free, it would determine itself first and independently of any other prior mover and determiner; but if it were second, such as the created will is, it would determine itself secondarily and dependently on the motion of the first free and first determiner.

You will insist first: These two things contradict each other and involve contradiction, namely that the will moves and determines itself, and nevertheless is first by nature moved and determined by God; otherwise the same thing would simultaneously be from itself and from another.

I respond that this objection was foreseen and solved by St. Thomas, for in 1 part question 105 article 4 he objects this argument to himself: "God cannot make contradictions to be simultaneous: but this would be required if he moved the will, for to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself, that is, not to be moved by another: Therefore God cannot move the will." To which he responds thus: "To the second it must be said that to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself, that is, from an intrinsic principle, but this intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle, and thus to be moved from oneself does not contradict being moved by another." He teaches the same in question 3 "On Evil" article 2 ad 4 with these words: "When free will moves itself, it is not excluded that it be moved by another, from whom it has this very thing that it moves itself." Likewise question 24 "On Truth" article 1 ad 5 says: "Something can be so moved by another that nevertheless it moves itself, and thus it is with the human mind." Therefore it does not contradict, according to St. Thomas, for the created will to move and determine itself to acting, and nevertheless to be moved and determined by God first by nature, and consequently to be premoved and predetermined by him. Reason also suggests this: for it does not contradict that some action proceed from two agents of diverse order, subordinated among themselves; for the same generation of a plant or man is from the Sun as first generator and from the plant or man as second generator: Therefore similarly the same determination of the created will can simultaneously be from God as first free and determiner and from the will as second free and determiner. Indeed the opposite

implies contradiction, since the determination of the created will is something created, existing in the nature of things and absorbing some degree of existence in itself, it cannot escape divine causality; hence since God cannot cause it through an indifferent decree or through simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above, it must necessarily be caused through a predetermining decree and through previous and predetermining concurrence: Therefore it implies that the created will determine itself unless it is predetermined by God.

You will insist secondly: What cannot cause the determining form cannot cause determination: But the will cannot cause the form determining it: Therefore neither can it determine itself. The major is clear. The minor is proved: The form determining the will is God's efficacious decree: But this cannot be caused by the will: Therefore the will cannot cause the form determining it.

I respond, the major being conceded, by denying the minor, and to its proof I distinguish the major: The form determining the will is only the efficacious decree, I deny the major. It is the efficacious decree and also the act which the will elicits, I concede the major, and the minor being conceded, I deny the consequence. For in order that the will be capable of determining itself, it is not required that it be able to cause any form determining it; but it suffices that it be able to cause some: but in our opinion there is a twofold form determining the created will, one on God's part, namely the efficacious and predetermining decree, another on the part of the will itself, namely the act elicited by it, which since it is free and exercises the freedom of the will, is also its determination: and consequently for there to be in the created will the power of determining itself, it is not required that it be able to cause God's efficacious decree, but it suffices that it be able to cause its own act determining it.

You will object secondly: It is of the nature of a free agent that, with all prerequisites for acting posited, it can not act: But with physical predetermination posited, the will cannot not act: Therefore it destroys freedom.

I respond that if the major is understood of prerequisites for acting by priority of time or of the instant in which, with those posited the free agent can act and not act, both in the composite and divided sense; but if it is understood of prerequisites by priority of nature only, or of the instant from which, with those posited the free agent can indeed not act in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense; for those things which are prerequisites for acting according to the order of nature only are simultaneous with the act (for priority of nature is not priority of existence and duration, but of dependence and causality), but it implies the negation of the act to be composed or joined with it. Since therefore physical predetermination is among the prerequisites for acting by priority of nature and causality only, and constitutes the actual principle of operation,

for the freedom of the will it is not required that with predetermination posited it can not act in the composite sense, or compose the negation of the act with it, but it suffices that with it posited it can not act in the divided sense, that is, that under it it retains the power of not acting or of not continuing the action which it elicits, concerning which more fully in part 2, treatise 2 chapter 4 § 4.

You will object thirdly: Every antecedent supposition, or one not descending from the free choice of our will, destroys the freedom of the will. But the predetermining decree and physical predetermination are some antecedent supposition and not descending from the choice of our will: Therefore they destroy the freedom of the will.

To this argument, which is paramount among the Adversaries like an Achillean one, a threefold response can be applied. First, the major can be absolutely denied, for a supposition preceding the free consent of our will by priority of nature alone does not take away freedom but causes it, nor does it destroy it but builds it. The reason is that priority of nature is priority of causality and origin, hence it belongs only to the cause with respect to the effect, or to an actual principle with respect to operation. Just as therefore a cause does not destroy or take away its effect but causes and perfects it, so a supposition preceding the free consent of our will by priority of nature alone (such as is the supposition of the predetermining decree and physical predetermination) does not take away freedom but causes it, nor does it harm it but fosters, perfects, and conserves it.

I respond secondly that although every antecedent supposition which arises from a created agent destroys freedom, nevertheless not every one that comes from an uncreated agent; for a threefold disparity is found between created and uncreated agent. The first is that a created agent is not of infinite efficacy like an uncreated one, and consequently cannot reach the substance and mode of freedom in our operations. The second is that God, since he is the first free and such by essence, and has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own, as Augustine says, contains all created and participated freedom in a most eminent and perfect mode, but not a created agent. The third is that created agents are entirely extrinsic to the will. But God, since he is the author and principle of the soul and is intimately joined to it like the soul of the soul itself, and as the principle in which we live, move, and have our being, is not properly considered as an extrinsic agent with respect to our will, as St. Thomas teaches in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 88.

I respond thirdly by distinguishing the major: Every antecedent supposition which does not arise from the first root of freedom takes away freedom, let the major pass. Which arises from the first root of freedom, I deny the major, and under the same

distinction of the minor, I deny the consequence. For the predetermining decree and physical predetermination arise from the first root of all freedom and contingency, namely from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, as we declared before; hence just as a supposition arising from the indifferent judgment of reason does not take away freedom, because that is the proximate root of freedom, so neither does a supposition arising from the predetermining decree and physical predetermination. From this you will understand that although such a supposition is formally antecedent, it is nevertheless virtually or equivalently consequent as to the effect of conserving freedom; because although it does not descend from the will itself, it nevertheless descends from him who has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own, and from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, which is the first root of freedom. Hence it is reduced to the second member of the distinction handed down by Anselm in book 2 "Why God Became Man" chapter 18, namely to consequent necessity, which does not harm freedom, as he teaches there.

Nor does the objection of a certain recent author avail, saying it seems absurd to deny antecedent to be the necessity whose cause is antecedent, since it is established among all that any necessity follows the condition of its cause and is denominated from it. For, as the dialecticians teach, one thing is that from which the signification of the name is imposed, and another is that for signifying which it is imposed: hence just as a stone is said to be from hurting the foot, yet everything that hurts the foot is not a stone: so although antecedent necessity takes this denomination from a preceding cause, nevertheless not every cause which precedes free will should or can be called antecedent necessity, but only that which precedes by determining the will to one through the mode of nature and taking away from the intellect the objective indifference of judgment, as happens in beatific love and volition of good in general.

From these things the proposed argument, in which the Adversaries especially trust, can easily be retorted against them in this way: Necessity which follows our freedom equivalently cannot take it away: But necessity arising from the efficacy of the predetermining decree and physical predetermination follows our freedom and consent equivalently, since it follows that which is contained eminently in the divine will and omnipotence, which, as Augustine says, has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own: Therefore it cannot take away freedom.

You will also understand from what has been said that although physical premotion is not in our power as if effectively and originatively, since it is not derived from us, it is nevertheless in our power as if terminatively and as to use; because that motion is terminated to this, that the will may have the use and exercise of actual freedom and actual dominion over its acts. Hence just as it can be called virtually or equivalently consequent, so also to be equivalently in our power, by the very fact that it makes the

act to which it moves and applies the will exist in its power and be subjected to its dominion.

You will object fourthly: If grace that is efficacious of itself and physically predetermining is necessary for conversion, it follows that the sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted, and consequently is not free to it, since it is of the nature of a free agent that it can act or not act.

But I respond first that the same difficulty exists concerning congruous grace, since that, in the opinion of Suarez and Vasquez and other theologians of the Society, is so necessary for conversion that it contradicts for a sinner to be actually converted unless he is prevented by such grace, as Father Martinon demonstrates in the "Anti-Jansenius," whose words we will relate in the following section.

I respond secondly by distinguishing the consequence: it follows that the sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted by consequent power and joined with act, I concede the consequence. By antecedent power and separated from act, I deny the consequence. For although the first power is from efficacious and physically predetermining grace, which infallibly joins power with act and cause with effect, according to that of Augustine in "On Nature and Grace" chapter 42: "With the will healed and aided, possibility together with effect comes about in the saints," nevertheless not the second. Hence just as St. Thomas in question 3 "On Power" article 5 ad 1 teaches that when it is said that God cannot act except what he foreknew and decreed, it is customary to distinguish concerning antecedent and consequent power: or if the "cannot" is referred to the act, it is conceded; if to the power, it is denied. So similarly when it is said that he who lacks efficacious aid cannot operate, cannot be converted, cannot fulfill the precepts, it must be distinguished: by antecedent power, it must be denied. By consequent power, it must be conceded. Or if the "cannot" is referred to the act, it is true. If it is referred to the power, it is false. These things are customarily explained more fully in the treatise on aids.

## § VII. *Another difficult argument is solved.*

The Adversaries moreover object another difficult argument, which Molina calls the touchstone, and is one of the principal foundations of middle knowledge, hence we touched on it briefly in the treatise on God's knowledge in the final chapter § 4, but we reserved the full and complete solution of it to this place. It can be briefly proposed thus: If the predetermining decree and physical predetermination flowing from it like a stream from a spring are entirely necessary for operating, and some affliction of free will prerequisite for acting, Christ would unjustly reprove the Jews in Matthew 11 in

preference to the Tyrians, that they did not convert and do penance: For the Jews would have a legitimate excuse and could respond to Christ the Lord's expostulation and rebuke: why do you reproach us with the example of the Tyrians, for if you had a predetermining decree concerning us and gave us efficacious and predetermining grace, which you had decreed to confer on them, certainly like them we would be converted and do penance? Hence the Adversaries say that from our opinion the necessity of correction is taken away, and the reproaches become vain by which God in sacred scripture reproaches his vineyard (that is, the Israelite people, or the faithful soul) that it does not bear grapes but thorns or wild grapes, that is, that it does not make the fruits of good works but evil and perverse works, as is found in Isaiah 1.

I respond first that the Apostle in Romans 9 objected the same difficulty to himself; for when he had established this truth, "God has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens," he immediately objects to himself: "You will therefore say to me, why does he still complain? Who resists his will?" As if to say, why does God complain or rebuke sinners? For if he wanted to have mercy and not harden (which he does, not by imparting malice, but by not bestowing grace) we would not resist. Behold the entire reason of the unjust complaint of sinners: as if a sinner persistent in evil cannot be reproved, to whom grace efficacious by its nature has been denied, and reproof is then only just when common sufficient grace is conferred on all, which each one from innate freedom renders efficacious and inefficacious? As if indeed the Apostle had not seen this most acute sense, nor Augustine, nor Prosper, who (as we saw above) profess that the profundity of this question cannot be solved by the willing or not willing of human will.

I respond secondly that the same argument was formerly proposed to St. Augustine by the Pelagians, for the monks of Adrumentum, under Abbot Valentine, contended that if efficacious grace were necessary for acting, the necessity of correction would be removed: hence they said that no one should be corrected if he does not do God's precepts, but only prayer should be made for him that he might do them, as Augustine relates in book 1 "Retractions" chapter 67. But let us hear them murmuring in the same Holy Doctor "On Correction and Grace" chapter 4 and saying: "I would rightly be corrected if I did not have it [namely grace] through my fault: that is, if I could give it to myself or take it myself and did not do so, or if when he was giving it I had been unwilling to receive it." And chapter 5: "Since therefore the will itself is prepared by the Lord, why do you correct me because you see me unwilling to do his precepts, and do you not rather ask him that he work willing in me?" From which it is clear that this argument of the Adversaries is not new, but very ancient and taken from the old workshop of the Pelagians. Hence a certain recent author not undeservedly exclaims: "What great consolation for the school of Thomists, that they are assailed by no arguments by which Augustine's opinion was not attacked! What deplorable

desolation, and how little safe the fortune of those who vibrate no other weapons against the Thomistic opinion than those which adversaries formerly hurled against Augustine! Is not the thesis of Augustine and the Thomists the same, if the same arguments militate against both?"

I respond thirdly that the proposed difficulty is common to us and the Adversaries, since Suarez, Vasquez, and other more celebrated theologians from the Society admit congruous grace; indeed all theology professors of the same Society are bound to teach it, from the prescription or decree of Claude Aquaviva, given at Rome in the year 1613, December 14, as Tanner and Paul Leonard testify, who also relate such a decree: but with such congruous grace admitted, the two inconveniences objected to us follow, namely that God unjustly complains of sinners who do not convert and that sufficient grace for conversion is denied to them, as Father Martinon, the most recent writer of the Society, shows in "Anti-Jansenius" disputation 27 section 3 number 25, where speaking of congruous grace, he writes: "If such great motion and excitation is morally necessary for conversion, therefore those who receive less do not have aid morally sufficient, and thus however many are not converted lack aid morally sufficient for conversion, and it is morally impossible for them to be converted. Hence this kind of complaint and reproach would be metaphysical, not moral and reasonable, which God forbid. What is it that I should have done more for my vineyard and did not do? Isaiah. For the Jews could deservedly respond: you should have given us aid morally sufficient, but not such with which it was morally impossible to be converted, and with which being prevented no one would be converted. How did you expect grapes from those for whom it was morally impossible not to bear wild grapes?" He has similar things in number 28.

I respond fourthly directly to the proposed difficulty, denying the consequence of the major. For Christ to justly reproach the Jews by the example of the Tyrians, it sufficed that they were equal in sufficient aids and that they put more impediments to efficacious aids than the Tyrians, by reason of greater ingratitude and hardening in sin: for as Augustine says in "On the Perseverance of the Good" chapter 14: "The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor was their heart so hardened, because they would have believed if they had seen such signs as these (namely the Jews) saw." The reason for the first is that for someone to be able to be justly corrected and rebuked by the example of another, it suffices that he can equally with him and yet does not provide equal things: but he who is equal to another in sufficient aids, although unequal in efficacious ones, can equally, because efficacious aids do not give the ability to act, nor do they provide power or complement of potency, but only actuality and application, as I suppose from the treatise on aids. The reason for the second is taken from the fact that he is culpable and worthy of reproof who through his own malice or negligence puts an obstacle and impediment to divine grace, and

consequently he who puts greater impediments to it than another can justly be rebuked and reproached in comparison to him. Hence St. Thomas in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 159: "Although someone cannot merit or call upon divine grace through the motion of free will, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it: for it is said in Job 21: 'Depart from us, we do not want knowledge of your ways.' And Job 24: 'They were rebels against the light.' And since it is in the power of free will to impede the reception of divine grace, it is not undeservedly imputed to him who provides impediment to the reception of grace: for God as far as concerns himself is prepared to give grace to all, for he wills all men to be saved, but those alone are deprived of grace who provide impediment to grace in themselves. Just as with the sun illuminating the world, it would be imputed to the fault of him who closes his eyes, although he cannot see unless prevented by the light of the sun."

From these things it is clear that God deservedly reproaches his vineyard that it does not bear grapes but thorns or wild grapes, or the faithful soul that it does not make the fruits of good works, because although the vineyard lacks some culture necessary for it to actually produce fruit, and the soul some aid by which it is applied to acting, nevertheless that defect and lack comes from the fault of man himself, who through his own malice or negligence provided impediment to divine grace. Just as it would justly be reproached to a man standing in darkness that he did not see, if someone offered him light and wanted to open the window, but he impeded it. Or (to stay with the same example) just as if a farmer had given the vineyard all the first cultures and was prepared to give it the last, and the vineyard refused it or put impediment to it, he could deservedly reproach it if afterwards it did not produce grapes but thorns or wild grapes.

From these things you will understand that since no one, however just, is immune from original and actual sin, at least venial, as Trent defines in session 9 canon 23, no one exists who should not humbly acknowledge that through the merit of his sins he can justly be abandoned by God and deprived of efficacious grace, and consequently who should not, as the Apostle warns, work out salvation with fear and trembling. Hence Pope Leo in sermon 8 "On the Epiphany": "This is the cause for the saints of fearing and being afraid, lest they themselves, elevated in works of piety, be abandoned by the help of grace and remain in the weakness of nature." Also for all truly humble people, the excellent opinion of Richard of St. Victor on this matter should always be kept before their eyes, from "On the Interior State of Man" part 1 chapter 12: "The grace which man once received before sin did not deserve to be justly withdrawn, which although he had received beyond merit, nevertheless he should not have lost without fault: but now it can justly be withdrawn every hour, because man can never be found without fault."

You will say first: if man can put impediment to efficacious and predetermining grace through his own fault or negligence, he will also be able to resist it, since to resist grace and to put impediment to it are synonymous and signify entirely the same thing. Man will also be able from the powers of free will to prepare himself for its reception, or at least not put impediment to its reception, and thus some flesh will be able to glory before God, namely the Tyrian before the Jew, that he rendered himself more apt for receiving the aids of grace from innate freedom.

But I deny both consequences. The first indeed, because just as although someone can impede the entrance of a solar ray into a hall by closing the window and put impediment to its reception, nevertheless he cannot deprive it once received of its effect, nor impede it from illuminating the air. So similarly, although man through his fault or negligence can impede the reception of efficacious and predetermining grace and by his unworthiness move God to denying it, nevertheless to it once received and existing in the soul, he cannot resist (by consequent power and in the composite sense, as we explained in the preceding § 6) or frustrate it of the effect which God efficaciously intends to produce through it. For it is impossible (says the Holy Doctor cited above) for these two things to be true simultaneously, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity and that he loses charity by sinning. The other consequence is also denied, namely that man will be able from the powers of free will to prepare himself for grace or at least not put impediment to it. For as St. Thomas says on chapter 12 of the Epistle to the Hebrews lecture 3: "This very thing that someone does not put obstacle to grace proceeds from grace itself: hence if someone puts it and yet his heart is moved to removing it, this is from the gift of God's grace." And afterwards he adds: "That therefore this obstacle is removed from some, this is from God's mercy; that it is not removed, this is from justice." Just as therefore, although man by closing the window can impede the illumination of the sun, nevertheless he cannot draw it to himself and call upon it. So likewise, although someone can impede himself from receiving grace, nevertheless he can neither merit nor call upon it, nor dispose himself for receiving it from the powers of free will alone, but only from the power of grace itself moving his heart.

You will say secondly: although the solution and doctrine handed down concerning the impediment which is put to efficacious and predetermining grace through antecedent fault can have place with respect to the denial of such grace in the state of fallen nature, nevertheless not with respect to the denial of it in the Angels and in Adam for persevering, since the denial of such aid supposes no antecedent fault in them, actual or original.

Some of our Thomists respond that the Angels and Adam lacked efficacious aid for persevering through their own fault, not indeed antecedent but concomitant, which

was prior to the privation of efficacious aid in the genus of material and dispositive cause. For it does not contradict that some things are simultaneous in time and duration and yet mutually precede each other by nature and causality; as is clear from the example of wind opening a window and entering through it into a hall; for the entrance of the wind precedes the opening of the window in the genus of efficient cause, since it actively concurs to it, and the very opening of the window is prior to the entrance of the wind in the genus of material dispositive cause, because it disposes to the aforesaid entrance of air and wind. Hence philosophers commonly teach that causes are mutually causes of each other, and that although they exercise their causalities in the same instant of time, nevertheless one is prior to another in one genus and posterior in another, by priority and posteriority of causality and nature. But because this solution seems more subtle than solid and has greater foundation in the doctrine of philosophers than of the Holy Fathers.

I respond secondly by conceding that the doctrine handed down above concerning impediment to efficacious grace through antecedent fault does not have place in the Angels nor in Adam, but in them the denial of efficacious grace for persevering is to be reduced to the simple will of God and his inscrutable judgments. For thus the Holy Fathers teach, especially Augustine in book 11 "On Genesis to the Letter" chapter 10, where speaking of the evil Angels he says: "But God could have converted their will to good, because he is omnipotent: he plainly could have; why therefore did he not do it? Because he did not will; why he did not will is with him." And in the treatise "On the New Canticle" chapter 8 he teaches that God permitted Adam's fall so that it might appear what free will could do without God's aid. "What free will not aided can do was demonstrated in Adam himself: for evil it suffices to itself, for good it does not unless aided by God." From this you will understand that the reason for the fall of Adam and the Angels cannot be given from the fact that the first actual grace conferred on them was purely sufficient and subjected to their free will as to efficacy and use, but they needed efficacious grace for persevering, which nevertheless God denied to Adam and the non-persevering Angels because he willed, and because it is with him to confer or deny it to whomever he wills. Nor can Suarez, Vasquez, and other defenders of congruous grace assign another reason why God denied congruous grace for persevering to the persevering Angels.

### § VIII.

#### *The harmony of divine sanctity with the predetermining decree and physical predetermination to the material of sin.*

It follows from the principles established above, dealing with the efficacy of divine decrees and physical predetermination, that God from eternity predefines the material of sin and in time physically predetermines the will to it: since such material is some

created being and includes in itself some actuality and some degree of existence, it cannot escape divine causality, and consequently must be subordinated to God as first cause: But such subordination cannot be preserved through an indifferent decree, nor through simultaneous concurrence exhibited by it, as we showed there; Therefore according to the principles established by us, a predetermining decree and physical predetermination to the material of sin must necessarily be admitted. Therefore it only remains for us here to explain how divine sanctity can cohere and be associated with such a decree and such predetermination. So that this harmony may be explained.

I say first: God, without any prejudice to his infinite sanctity, can predefine, and in fact does predefine the material of sin, taken materially, that is, insofar as it is being and physical and vital act.

The conclusion is proved by a fundamental reason: God without prejudice to his infinite sanctity predefines all good acts as such, whether they are good with moral and natural goodness simultaneously, or only with natural or physical goodness: But the material of sin, taken materially, is a good act, with goodness not indeed moral but natural or physical; since under this aspect and according to its physical being, it does not pertain to the moral line, nor therefore to the line of moral evil, but to the line of natural and physical being, which is good with physical and natural goodness: Therefore the material of sin, taken materially, can be predefined by God without any injury or prejudice to his infinite sanctity.

The Adversaries respond that although the material of sin, taken materially and specifically, is good from its genus or line, nevertheless because of the indispensable connection it has with moral malice, in hatred of God for example, God cannot by his decree efficaciously will and predefine it unless he also indirectly and secondarily efficaciously wills and predefines the formal itself; hence since this contradicts divine sanctity, that likewise must be considered adverse to it.

But against this first: Although some things are inseparably connected among themselves, it does not follow, nor is it necessary, that a cause or power which reaches one must necessarily reach the other, as is clear in the good which although it is identified with the true, indeed is even transcendentally included in it, yet is so reached by the will that the true is in no way reached by it; because the true is not the object of the will, but the good: Therefore similarly, although in intrinsically evil acts, e.g., in hatred of God, the material of sin cannot be really separated from the formal, or from moral malice; by the very fact however that such malice is not contained within the adequate object of the divine will, but its material or foundation specifically considered is, God can reach the material of that sin by his efficacious and

predefinitive decree, without reaching its formal in any way, even indirectly. This reason will be pressed more in the following conclusion.

This is confirmed: The material of sin, although connected with the formal, terminates divine complacency without the formal malice terminating it: Therefore likewise it will be able to terminate God's efficacious volition and predetermining decree without formal malice terminating it. The consequence is clear, for if divine complacency terminated to the material of sin does not necessarily pass to the formal, this is therefore because the material is contained within the object of the divine will, but not the formal: But with this reason admitted, no reason can be assigned why the same is not said of God's efficacious volition: Therefore this will be able to be terminated to the material of sin without extending to the formal. The antecedent is proved: The material of sin does not terminate an act of displeasure of the divine will: Therefore it terminates divine complacency, and since the divine will cannot be pleased in formal malice, it is true to say that the material of sin terminates divine complacency without formal malice terminating it. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: God's omnipotence truly and properly causes the material of sin, which since it is created and participated being cannot escape divine causality: Therefore it does not terminate divine hatred and displeasure. The consequence is manifest, both from that of Wisdom 11: "You hate nothing of what you have made." And also because if the material of sin, as caused by God's omnipotence, displeased God and terminated his hatred, it would follow that omnipotence itself, as influencing into it, would displease God and terminate his hatred; for to whom a work displeases, the one influencing into it also displeases; hence because sin displeases God, the sinning man also displeases him, according to that of Wisdom 14: "Hateful to God is the impious man and his impiety": But it is most absurd to say that God's omnipotence, as influencing into the material of sin, displeases him: Therefore also to assert that the material of sin terminates an act of displeasure of the divine will.

This is further confirmed: Because the material of sin is contained within the object of divine omnipotence, but not the formal, God by his omnipotence causes through previous concurrence the material of sin without causing the formal, as we will show in the following conclusion: But this reason militates with equal efficacy in God's will, since it is no less holy nor less precise than his omnipotence: Therefore the divine will will be able to predefine the material of sin without predefining the formal annexed to it and inseparably conjoined with it, and consequently without any injury and prejudice to divine sanctity.

I say secondly: God physically predetermines the will to the material of sin, or influences into it through previous concurrence, without any prejudice to divine sanctity.

This is proved first: When the soul moves and applies a curved leg to walking, it so causes that motion insofar as it is physical and vital that nevertheless it does not effect it insofar as it is oblique and defective; but the defect of lameness is totally reduced to the curved leg, because that defect is not contained within the adequate object of the locomotive power: But similarly the formal of sin, or its moral malice, is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence: Therefore God can so apply and predetermine the human will to the material of sin that nevertheless he does not apply nor predetermine it to the formal annexed to it and inseparable from it, and consequently without prejudice to divine sanctity. The major is clear. The minor is shown thus: The adequate object of divine omnipotence is that which is reducible and orderable to God as ultimate end, since the reason of first principle and ultimate end are convertible among themselves; hence it is said in Proverbs 16: "The Lord has made all things for himself": But the formal of sin, or its moral malice, is not orderable to God as ultimate end, since it is rather recession and deviation from him as ultimate end: Therefore it is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence.

This is proved secondly by an argument ad hominem: God in fact concurs with simultaneous concurrence with the created will to the material of sin, and yet does not concur with it to formal malice; otherwise such malice would be attributed to God, just as the material entity of sin is attributed to him: Therefore he can also premove and predetermine to the material entity of sin without premving and predetermining to formal malice, and consequently without injury to divine sanctity. The consequence is proved first because malice and deformity of sin is much more connected with simultaneous concurrence than with previous concurrence; for it is joined with the first proximately and immediately, but with the second only mediately and remotely; because simultaneous concurrence is the very act of the will as it is from God simultaneously operating, with which act the very malice of sin is immediately conjoined; but previous concurrence is not identified with the action of the will, but is something previous to it; hence it is not conjoined with the malice and deformity of sin except through the mediation of the act of the will: Therefore if God can concur with the created will to the material of sin through simultaneous concurrence without concurring to the formal, a fortiori he will be able to do this through previous concurrence. Secondly, divine omnipotence is no less precise as predetermining than as simultaneously concurring with the will: Therefore if as simultaneously concurring it reaches the entity and actuality of the sinful act and prescinds from formal malice, it will also be able to prescind from it by predetermining. Thirdly, therefore God by simultaneously concurring to the material of sin prescinds from the formal because this is not contained within the sphere or adequate object of divine omnipotence: But this reason militates with equal efficacy for previous and predetermining concurrence: Therefore the same as before.

The adversaries respond that this difference exists between previous and simultaneous concurrence, that the latter is indifferent and through it God does not determine the created will, but rather is determined by it; but previous and predetermining concurrence is not determined by the created will but determines it, hence the latter cannot be precise, though the former can be.

But against this first: According to this solution and doctrine, the created will determines divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act, and yet does not determine it to formal malice: Therefore likewise God through his concurrence will be able to determine the created will to the entity of the same act without determining it to malice. The consequence seems manifest, for no reason can be assigned why the created will is more precise in determining divine concurrence than divine omnipotence and will in determining the concurrence of the created will: Therefore if the former can determine divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act, prescinding from malice, that is, not determining God's concurrence to it, God will also be able to determine the concurrence of the created will to the entity of the act, not determining it to malice but prescinding from it.

Against this secondly: Granted that God's concurrence considered in first act, that is, the decree of concurring with free causes, is indifferent, or that God offers his concurrence to the will in an indifferent manner, nevertheless the actual and exercised concurrence by which he in fact simultaneously influences with the created will to an act of hatred of God, for example, cannot be indifferent, since it is intimately absorbed in that act and identified with it. Therefore I ask whether such actual and exercised concurrence reaches only the entity and substance of that intrinsically evil act, or also extends to its malice and deformity? If the first is said, it follows that previous concurrence will a fortiori be able to prescind from the malice and deformity of the same act and reach only its substance and entity, because, as we said above, previous concurrence is more distant from such annexed malice and deformity than simultaneous concurrence. But if the latter is asserted, it follows that God through simultaneous concurrence causes the malice and deformity of sin, which contradicts divine sanctity.

To extricate themselves from these arguments, the Adversaries fall into various absurdities and are forced to swallow and digest many inconveniences. For some recent authors, not being able or willing to conceive how God can cause the material of sin while prescinding from formal malice, have dared to recall from ashes and tomb the opinion of Durandus and Aureolus, long since extinct and buried, and to assert that God does not cause the entity of sin and its material immediately, but only mediately and remotely, insofar as he gave the will the power of operating and consequently of producing the entity and actuality of the evil acts which it elicits.

But this opinion is called audacity or temerity by St. Anselm in the book "On Foreknowledge and Free Will": "It is audacity to say that something is being which is not from the first being." And St. Thomas in 2 Sentences distinction 37 question 2 article 2 says it is very close to a double error. And in 2 Sentences distinction 37 unique question article 1 that it is heretical and contrary to reason: "It is heretical to say that some being, insofar as it is being, is not from God, and this is not only contrary to faith but also to reason." Similarly Albert the Great in 2 Sentences distinction 35 article 7 says that this opinion "which had prevailed among many of the ancients, has almost ceased from the court and is considered heretical by many moderns." Finally Dominic Soto in book 1 "On Nature and Grace" chapter 18 says there is unanimous consent of theologians that God causes the entity of sin which underlies its malice and deformity. "Indeed the theologians do not deny that God is the cause of the entity (as they call it) which is sin, in that genus of efficiency by which he promotes all animate and inanimate things to their natural actions."

Reason also suggests this, for as St. Thomas argues in the cited places: "What does not have being from itself cannot have operation from itself: But the entity of sinning man does not belong to him from himself: Therefore neither can the actual entity of sin belong to him from himself." Moreover, as the same Holy Doctor argues in 2 Sentences distinction 37 question 2 article 2 in the argument "But against": "Whatever is not the cause of the operation through which some substance is produced in being is not the cause of that substance: But through some action of sin certain substances are produced in being, just as through adulteries and fornications men are generated: If therefore God is not the cause of these actions insofar as they are actions, neither is he the cause of the men who are generated through these actions, which is absurd."

Other recent authors, positioned at the other extreme, seeing that if it is admitted that God's simultaneous concurrence is precise and reaches the entity of sin while prescinding from its malice and deformity, the same can be said of previous and predetermining concurrence, say that God through simultaneous concurrence not only causes the entity and substance of evil acts but also their malice and deformity. They add however that God does this as if unwilling and coerced, and as if drawn and determined by the human will, lest he fail in the office of first cause or violate the rights of created freedom.

But this response and doctrine can be refuted in many ways. First, it seems impious to assert that God, as determined by the human will, follows its fall and causes the malice and deformity of its sin, and is as if drawn by it into fellowship of its crime; for this seems manifestly to contradict divine sanctity. Hence just as the authors of the former solution already attacked take away from God the nature of first cause to

defend the rights of divine sanctity, so these on the contrary, to preserve the nature of first cause in God, wear away the reputation of divine sanctity.

Secondly, it contradicts that God, even as drawn and determined by the human will, cause that which is not contained under the adequate object of his omnipotence: But the malice and deformity of sin, since it is recession from God as ultimate end, is not contained under the adequate object of divine omnipotence, since that is only what is orderable to God as ultimate end, as was shown above: Therefore it cannot be caused by God, even as drawn and determined by the human will.

Thirdly, what is from someone only permissively is not properly said to be caused by him, as Anselm teaches in the book "On the Fall of the Devil" chapter 1, and is clear from the fact that permission is only the negation of impediment, but pure negation cannot truly cause and bestow real being: But the formal malice of sin is from God only permissively, as is clear from Trent session 6 canon 6: Therefore it is not caused by God even as drawn and determined by the created will.

Fourthly, God does not cause that which he hates, according to that of Wisdom 11: "You hate nothing of what you have made": But he hates the malice and deformity of sin, as is clear from that of Wisdom 14: "Hateful to God are the impious man and his impiety": Therefore he does not cause it. This is confirmed: If God's omnipotence caused sin in the formal aspect of malice, it itself as efficient and influencing into it would displease God and terminate his hatred: But this cannot be said, otherwise God would hate himself and displease himself: Therefore neither the former. The consequence of the major is evident: to whom a work displeases, the one influencing into it also displeases: Therefore if God's omnipotence caused sin formally as such and influenced into its malice and deformity, which displeases God, it would likewise displease him and terminate his hatred.

Fifthly, if the malice of sin proceeded efficiently from God as first cause, it would be reduced to God more than to sinning man; for an effect proceeding from first and second cause depends more on the first cause than on the second, and consequently is reduced more to the former than to the latter: The consequent is absurd and entirely injurious to divine sanctity: Therefore the antecedent.

Finally, if God influenced not only into the material entity of sin but also into its formal malice, he could be called the cause and author of sin, which is to fall into Calvin's error condemned by Trent. The consequence is proved: God is the first cause and first author of the entity and actuality of the sinful act, although, according to the doctrine of the Adversaries, he influences into it only as drawn and determined by the human will determining the indifference of the divine decree: Therefore similarly,

although he influences into its malice and deformity only as drawn and determined by the created will, he can nevertheless be called the cause and author of sin.

From these things you will understand that the Thomists better and more easily reconcile God's infinite sanctity with the nature and dignity of first cause and first principle than the Adversaries. For the latter, admitting indifferent decrees in God, take away from him the nature of first cause with respect to the determination of the created will, as we showed above, and nevertheless do not preserve the rights of divine sanctity, since to extricate themselves from the arguments of the Thomists, they are finally forced to assert that God, as drawn and determined by the created will, influences not only into the entity of sin but also into its malice and deformity through simultaneous concurrence. But the Thomists, abhorring both, to reconcile the dignity of first cause with God's sanctity, recur with St. Thomas to the infinite efficacy of the divine will and omnipotence, by reason of which God so causes the material entity of sin that he prescinds from its formal malice, as the Holy Doctor expressly teaches in question 3 "On Power" article 7 ad 15 with these words: "Because the first cause influences more into the effect than the second, therefore whatever of perfection is in the effect is principally reduced to the first; but what is of defect must be reduced to the second cause, which does not operate as efficaciously as the first": Therefore according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, it is so far from following that from the efficacy of the divine decree toward the material of sin, the formal malice found in the act of our will is reduced to the divine will and its causality, that rather such efficacy makes the malice and deformity of sin be referred not to the first cause but to the second.

### § IX. *Objections are solved.*

You will object first: If God by absolute and efficacious will predefines the material of sin and predetermines the will to it, it will be licit and praiseworthy for man to will it; But this is absurd: Therefore also the former. The consequence of the major seems manifest, for it is licit and praiseworthy to will everything that God wills, since it is praiseworthy to conform oneself to the divine will in all things.

I respond by denying the consequence of the major, and to its proof I say that although it is licit and praiseworthy to will everything that God wills as special mover and provider, nevertheless not everything that he wills by the general will of the first mover and universal provider; for by this general will he wills to permit sins and simultaneously concur with us to their material, as the Adversaries confess, and yet it is neither praiseworthy nor licit to will them, nor is it always an act of virtue to conform oneself to such will.

You will object secondly: Man cannot posit the material of sin without consequently positing the malice and deformity annexed to it: Therefore if God by absolute and efficacious will wills that man posit and produce such material, he consequently also wills that he posit the malice adjoined to it, and therefore that he sin.

I respond, the antecedent being conceded, by denying the consequence. For that discourse suffers from the same vice as these: The soul absolutely and efficaciously wills a curved leg to be moved with progressive motion: But a curved leg cannot be moved with progressive motion except by limping: Therefore the soul absolutely and efficaciously wills that the curved leg limp. Likewise: God efficaciously wills that Peter be generated by Paul: But Peter cannot be generated by Paul without contracting original sin: Therefore God efficaciously wills Peter to contract such sin. A similar argument can also be formed from the principles of the Adversaries: For God, according to their principles, by absolute and efficacious decree wills to place man in those occasions and circumstances in which he foresaw through middle knowledge that he would sin: But it is impossible that man placed in those occasions and circumstances not sin, otherwise divine foreknowledge would be deceived and what God foreknew would not happen: Therefore God by absolute and efficacious decree wills that man fall into sin. Just as therefore those consequences are not valid, so neither is that which is made in the proposed argument. The reason is that (as we showed above) identified things, or those connected among themselves, can be prescinded not only intentionally and through cognition, but also really, through volition and causality: and this always happens when of two reasons or formalities connected among themselves, one is contained within the formal object of some power or within the sphere of activity of some cause, but not the other: hence since moral malice is not contained within the formal object of God's will, nor within the sphere of divine causality and omnipotence, but the entity and actuality of it is, God can by absolute and efficacious will will and predefine the material of sin under the aspect of being and act, and predetermine the will to it, without such predefinition or predetermination extending to the malice and deformity adjoined to it from the defectibility of the created will. Hence St. Thomas in 3 "Against the Gentiles" chapter 162: "Every sin comes from some defect of the proximate agent, but not from the influence of the first agent; just as the sin of lameness comes from the disposition of the leg, but not from the motive power, although from it comes whatever of perfection of motion appears in lameness: but the proximate agent of human sin is the will; therefore the defect of sin is from the will of man, but not from God who is the first agent, from whom nevertheless comes whatever pertains to the perfection of action in that sin."

You will say: to posit the material of sin with defect and moral malice is the same as to posit it with freedom and advertence of reason: But God through his predefinition

wills, and effects through physical predetermination, that man posit the material of sin with freedom and advertence of reason: Therefore he wills and makes through such predefinition and predetermination that man posit the material of sin with defect and moral malice.

I respond by denying the major. Although freedom and advertence of reason are conditions necessarily required for human acts to be morally evil, moral malice does not consist in them, but either in the privation of rectitude and conformity with law, as some want, or as others more probably think, in transcendental order to the object as disconformed to the rules of morals. Hence since God by his predefinition does not will, nor by his predetermination effect, that man posit the material of sin as founding or connoting such privation, or as expressing that transcendental order, hence it happens that he neither wills through his predefinition nor effects through his predetermination that man posit the material of sin with defect and moral malice, but only that he produce in it entity, actuality, vitality, and other aspects pertaining to the physical order and reducible to God as first principle and ultimate end.

You will insist: Everything positive must be predefined and predetermined by God. Therefore if the formal of sin consists in the positive, as the more common and more probable opinion of theologians asserts, it must be predefined and predetermined by God, and consequently caused.

I respond first that the same argument can be made concerning simultaneous concurrence, since everything positive and real must be produced by God through simultaneous concurrence.

I respond secondly by distinguishing the antecedent: Everything positive must be predefined and predetermined by God under the aspect of positive entity, I concede. Under the aspect of defect and deformity, I deny. Concerning which in the "Treatise on Sins" chapter 8 § 2.

You will object thirdly: God cannot morally move and predetermine man to the material of sin, otherwise he would tempt, seduce, and entrap him. Therefore neither can he physically. The consequence seems manifest, since physical motion is intrinsically efficacious and holds itself on the part of power, it is much greater and more vehement than moral motion, which is not efficacious of itself and only intrinsically and objectively allures and invites the agent to operating.

I respond, the antecedent being conceded, by denying the consequence and parity. For multiple differences intervene between physical and moral motion. For the first is precise and stops within the physical order, but not the second, which extends to the moral order and attends principally to those things which are of that order. The first

only regards the entity and actuality of the act to which it moves, the second attends or should attend to conformity or disconformity with law. The first belongs to God as he has the nature of first cause and universal provider, the second belongs to him as special provider and mover. Hence although if God morally moved man to the material of sin, he would tempt and entrap him, nevertheless from the fact that he physically moves and predetermines him to such material, it does not follow that he tempts or seduces him, but only that he applies him to producing the entity and actuality which is found in it and which is primarily and per se reduced to divine causality and omnipotence. To the proof to the contrary it must be said that although physical motion is greater than moral intensively, that is, more powerful and efficacious, it is nevertheless lesser extensively, because it stops within the physical order and does not extend to the line of morals, as moral motion does.

I add that if this argument were valid, it could easily be retorted against the Adversaries. For they teach that although God through middle knowledge sees infinite occasions and circumstances in which men would not sin but would act well and be converted, he nevertheless sometimes places them in others in which through the same knowledge he infallibly foresaw them as about to sin. Hence I argue thus: He who places man in occasions of sinning morally premoves and predetermines him to sinning; for just as occasions of sinning morally and objectively move to sin, so also he who places man in them is considered to premove and predetermine morally to sinning, hence it is commonly said: "occasion makes the thief": Therefore if God sometimes places men in those circumstances and occasions in which through middle knowledge he foresaw them as infallibly about to fall into sin, he tempts, seduces, and entraps them, and morally premoves and predetermines them to sin, which since it is an effect, or rather defect, moral, must be reduced to a morally moving cause, not to one physically predetermining.

You will say with a certain recent author: God, in the opinion of the Thomists, predetermines the persuasions by which the devil morally moves us to sinning: Therefore he predetermines not only physically but also morally to evil acts.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: he predetermines persuasions etc. insofar as they are physical and vital acts, I concede the antecedent. Insofar as they are morally evil and inducing to sin, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For just as in the opinion of the Adversaries, God causes such persuasions, as certain physical and vital acts, in devils through simultaneous concurrence, and yet is not considered to cooperate with their malice; so neither in our opinion is he considered to move to sinning, although through previous concurrence he produces the same persuasions, as they are vital and physical operations, in them.

You will object fourthly: Trent session 6 chapter 6 condemns those who say that God does not conduct himself only permissively toward sins and evil works: But this seems to follow from our opinion: Therefore it does not seem consonant with Trent. The minor is proved: he who causes something to which another infallibly follows is not considered nor can be said to conduct himself only permissively in regard to that: e.g., because death infallibly follows the infliction of a lethal wound, and blindness the piercing of eyes, he who inflicts a lethal wound on another or pierces his eyes is ineptly and abusively said to permit his death or blindness: But from the predefinition and predetermination of the material of sin, sin infallibly follows, since it is impossible that man freely and advertently elicit an evil and prohibited act and not sin: Therefore with that supposed, God cannot be said (except abusively and nugatorily) to conduct himself only permissively in regard to sins.

This is confirmed: For God to conduct himself permissively toward something is not to impede it when he can, as St. Thomas teaches in 1 Sentences distinction 47 question 1 article 2 in the body and ad 3. But supposing that God predetermines the will to the material of sin, e.g., hatred of God, he cannot impede its malice, since its entity freely produced cannot be separated from malice: Therefore neither can he be said to permit it.

To the objection I respond by denying the minor, and to its proof I distinguish the major: He who causes something to which another infallibly follows is not considered nor can be said to conduct himself only permissively toward that. If it follows by physical consequence and causality, I concede the major. If it follows only by logical consequence and inference, I deny the major. For to the vital motion of a curved leg, lameness infallibly follows, and yet the soul causing that motion is not considered to be a positive cause but only a permissive one of such defect; because since that is not contained within the sphere of activity of the locomotive power, it does not follow the progressive motion by physical consequence and causality, but only by logical consequence and inference. Hence the examples adduced in the objection are not to the point, because death and blindness, since they are within the sphere of activity of second causes, follow *per se* and from the nature of the thing, and by physical consequence, to the infliction of lethal wound and piercing of eyes; on the contrary however, since the malice and deformity of sin is not within the adequate object of the divine will, nor within the sphere of its causality, it does not result nor follow from the predetermination of the will to the material of sin by physical consequence and causality, but only by logical consequence and inference, as we declared in the preceding treatise chapter 4 at the end of § 2.

To the confirmation it must be said that although God, with the decree predetermining the will to the material of sin posited, cannot in the composite sense impede its malice,

namely by joining impediment, and thus negation of the malice of the act of hatred of God, with predefinition, and consequently with the position of such material: nevertheless just as the will even eliciting that act can in the divided sense not elicit it, so also God can impede it in the divided sense from eliciting it. But for some cause to be considered to conduct itself only permissively toward some defect, it is not always required that it be able to impede it in the composite sense, or by consequent power, as is clear from the often adduced example of the soul moving a curved leg to walking, which is considered to permit the defect of lameness although, with the motion of the curved leg supposed, it cannot compose the negation of such defect of lameness with such motion.

### § X. *Refutation of Calvinism.*

From what has been said throughout this entire chapter, it is left manifest that the opinion of the Thomists differs greatly from Calvin's doctrine and has no affinity with his errors. First, as far as concerns the causality and efficacy of divine decrees and the aids flowing from them, there are two principal differences between Thomistic and Calvinian doctrine. The first and principal is that Calvin and the rigid Calvinists, as they are called, teach that divine decrees and aids are so efficacious that they absorb all indifference of the human will, and with only spontaneity or immunity from coercion left, they take away from it the proximate power of dissenting. For in the "Antidote" to canon 5 session 6 he writes: "What therefore does Augustine mean when he speaks of the freedom of the will? Namely what he so often repeats, that men are not forced by God's invincible grace but are ruled voluntarily, so that they willingly obey and follow." But the Thomists compose divine decrees and aids, however efficacious and predetermining of themselves, with the actual indifference of the will and the power of dissenting, so that these two are always joined together: grace in the will, and in the same will constituted under grace, sufficient power of not consenting, according to that of St. Prosper in 2 "On the Calling of Nations" chapter 27: "God so gives willing to obey him that he does not take away from even those who will persevere that mutability by which they can not will."

The second difference, related to this and as its corollary, is taken from the diverse understanding of composite and divided sense: since Calvin and the rigid Calvinists affirm that divine decrees and aids consume and absorb all indifference of the will and all power of dissenting, they necessarily deduce from the consequence of this error that the distinction of composite and divided sense is to be taken so that the will cannot dissent from God moving in composite sense, but only in divided sense, signifies that the will does not have the power of dissenting as long as divine motion is present and perseveres in the soul, excluding this power of dissenting, but only when

it is absent or has departed. But the Thomists, since they want divine decrees and aids to rule the will in such a way that they do not take away the power of resisting or dissenting, consequently assert that the will cannot dissent from God moving in composite sense, but only in divided sense, denotes that although actual dissent cannot be joined and composed with divine motion (as being intrinsically efficacious and consequently infallibly inferring assent), nevertheless the will, even as it is subject to grace and is moved and applied by it to acting, retains absolute power of dissenting. Hence Alvarez in book 2 "Responses" chapter 1 number 34: "The composite sense is not that which is insinuated in the argument, namely that when efficacious grace is in the will, the will cannot not perform that act to which it is determined, but with the motion removed it can not act; for this was Calvin's sense."

These two differences of Thomistic doctrine from Calvinian are so manifest that Father Arnauld could not hide or dissimulate them: for in the book he published "On Unforced Freedom" page 226, he expressed both differences in these words: "What Jansenist will they find among the Thomists who said that the will predetermined by divine grace lacks proximate power to dissent? Whom will they give who interprets the distinction of composite and divided sense so that the sense is that the will moved by God can dissent when that motion is absent and another comes?"

From these things you will understand how great are the conflicts of words and thoughts fighting among themselves in this Author. First, in the book published at Toulouse for the defense of middle knowledge, disputation 4 final chapter, he writes that no difference is found between Thomists and Calvin except verbally and as to mode of speaking. Hence there in number 120 he exclaims: "Is not the petition of the defenders of middle knowledge just, who after long altercation of so many years still ask what is the real difference between the doctrine of the Adversaries and Calvin in that precise doubt in which it is asked whether or not there is some use of free will in man?" And yet in the cited place of the book "On Unforced Freedom" and other places to be related below, he assigns the two differences already explained.

Secondly, the same Author there in number 95 says that the mode of defending freedom which Amesius accepted from Alvarez (namely that the power of dissenting is said to exist simultaneously with the aid by which man is moved to assenting) pertains to Calvinism and is not according to the mind of Trent. And yet in book 4 "Against the Baianists" chapter 8 § 7 number 4 he writes: "Luther and Calvin and their followers are therefore heretics because they do not admit free will such as Trent demands, namely that excited by God through efficacious grace, it can nevertheless dissent." And below: "It is therefore consequent that we say the proximate power of dissenting is both sanctioned by Trent and heretically denied by heretics." Likewise in the response to the tenth letter of Louis Montaltius: "Catholic Doctors agree among

themselves that grace efficacious per se so rules the will that it does not take away the power and force of resisting it, so that these two are composed among themselves: grace in the will, and in the same will constituted under grace, sufficient power of not consenting, nor do they doubt that this is the true sense of the Council of Trent in those words: 'he can dissent if he wills.'"

Thirdly, in the aforesaid book published for the defense of middle knowledge, depicting a picture of Thomistic freedom, he asserts that the Thomists demand only two things for true and perfect freedom, namely in the intellect objective indifference of judgment, and in the will spontaneity or immunity from coercion: from which picture he there says Calvin deleted nothing at all: "After we have examined all things from the opinion of the Adversaries, we find nothing other than God's predefinition being absolute, efficacious, infallible, infrustrable, from which follows the action of the will, excluding all coercion and violence, and supposing mediocrity of cognitions." Nevertheless in the places already related, he manifestly declares that the Thomists, besides these two, demand a third thing moreover for the true nature of freedom, namely the power of dissenting or not acting, which separates the Thomists from the Calvinists. Likewise in the book he published under the name of Eugenius Philadelphus page 653 of the Parisian edition, he says the Thomists preserved their boundaries from heretics unconfused by this one line (namely the power of dissenting).

Fourthly, the same Author in the aforesaid book on middle knowledge implicates the Thomists with the Calvinists, and in the books published against the Baianists and Jansenists, he separates them from the Jansenists, and yet says the error of Jansenius and Calvin is the same. These things certainly cannot be reconciled otherwise than by denying that common principle of syllogistic art and natural light: "Things which are the same to a third thing are the same among themselves." I omit many other antilogies, or conflicts of words and thoughts dissenting among themselves, which are found in the aforesaid books of this Author (writing diverse and opposite things according to the diverse reason of times and as he saw it expedient for his causes and his own utility). For we have dealt with this extensively in the "Apology of the Thomists" which is found in the "Shield of Thomistic Theology" Volume 1 at the end of the treatise on God's will. Hence we can deservedly direct those words of Tertullian "On Spectacles" to this Author: "This is the integrity of truth, and the fullness of discipline owed to it, and equality of fear, and faith of obedience: not to change opinion nor vary judgment."

As concerns Calvin's other error by which he makes God the cause and Author of sin, there are likewise two principal differences between Thomistic and Calvinian doctrine. For Calvin made God the author of sin under a double title. The first and

principal is taken from the fact that he taught that God moves the will of man to acts, whether good or evil, only spontaneously and not freely, and as a horse is moved by a rider, as is clear from what was said above: for supposing that God moves the will to evil and sinful acts by that motion which takes away the indifference of the will and which necessitates the will, it evidently follows that the malice and deformity of sin cannot be reduced to the created will but only to God's motion: because the will moved and excited by only spontaneous motion and lacking actual indifference and power to the opposite cannot influence moral malice into its acts, which cannot subsist without freedom of indifference and power to the opposite, as is manifest in first-first motions and indeliberate acts. Hence if any moral malice is found in its acts, it must necessarily be referred to God as Author. The other reason is by which Calvin cannot not make God the author of sin, namely that he taught that he moves the will of man to evil acts by moral motion, commanding the devil to tempt, seduce, and induce men into sin, as will be clear to one reading chapter four of book two of the "Institutions": for moral motion, since it is not precise like physical motion, as we declared in the preceding section, extends not only to the entity and substance of the act but also to its malice and deformity, at least secondarily and indirectly. Since therefore the Thomists neither acknowledge only spontaneity in the will moved and predetermined by God, nor say that God moves to evil acts, even as they are physical and vital, by moral motion, but only by physical, it is manifest that they differ from Calvin by the whole heaven and have no affinity or commerce with him as to the aforesaid error by which he makes God the author of sin.

Nor does it matter that Calvin sometimes seems to distinguish between the entity of sin and its malice and attribute the first to God but not the second, and deny that he is the author of sin; for he denies this only because of the sound of words and to avoid the invidious nature of words, and contrary to his principles, since the opposite manifestly follows from that double principle which he admits, namely that God moves the will to evil acts only spontaneously and not freely, and commands the Devil to tempt men and induce them into sin, which is to move them to the act of sin by moral motion. I add from Andrew Duval, Doctor of the Sorbonne, volume 1 on the second part of the second page 53, that innumerable places existed in Calvin's "Institutions" in which he expressly and in terms said that God is the author of sins even as to the malice and deformity which they formally import, but these were erased by the Calvinists in later editions. Beccanus also shows in volume 1 "Summa of Theology" chapter 16 by the testimony of David Pareus, a famous Calvinist, indeed a leader of the Calvinist faction in Germany, that Calvin really made God the author of crimes, and that in this error, which even ears shudder to hear, many Calvinists defected from Calvin. Why therefore does Father Arnauld in his book on middle knowledge attempt to absolve Calvin from that crime from which not even the more rigid Calvinists absolve him? Why does he try to wash that Ethiopian and say that he

distinguishes between the material and formal of sin, or between its entity and malice, and attributes only the first to God, not the latter, and that if we respect the use of words, he is sufficiently religious to beware lest he say God is the author of sin? Certainly other theologians of the Society are more sincere and cautious in this part, who frankly confess that Calvin attributes both to God as Author and makes God the author of sins.

From what has been said it is clear that the Master from Lorca of the Cistercian Order spoke truly and prudently in disputation 21 "On Grace" conclusion 2: "Those exceed too much who with insuperable contention defend that physical predetermination, which the Thomists teach, takes away freedom, and that the opinion which asserts it differs nothing or little from Calvin. Since it is evident that it is the doctrine of St. Thomas and many of the ancient Scholastics, it should in no way be feared that there is any danger in it, but rather it should be believed to be consonant with the Catholic faith. And to use these censures is done neither piously nor prudently." Therefore I do not think that the most pious and wise Cardinal Bellarmine wrote what is read in his controversies, namely that the opinion which teaches that efficacious grace is a physical quality of God which determines the will to willing and choosing good seems or is entirely the same as the error of Calvin and Luther, or differs little from them. It is more credible and probable that those words were intruded by certain German Jesuits who were in charge of printing this book of Controversies, as we showed in the "Apology of the Thomists." But whatever the case about this, I oppose to Bellarmine Baronius, who declares Molina's doctrine to be dangerous by its novelty, contrary to Augustine, and related to the errors of the Pelagians or Semipelagians in a letter sent to the Lord de Villars, Archbishop of Vienne, which I will here transcribe entirely and word for word.

### **TO THE MOST ILLUSTRIOS AND MOST REVEREND LORD.**

Forgive me if I write back to your Lordship's letters later than is fitting, which as holy, pure, and orthodox in all things I have kissed, from which may it be far that I dissent even in the smallest point or punctuation. Only about Molina's books does controversy remain. I have read them, but not without nausea, since in them he shows nothing more powerful than to oppose Saint Augustine (although he never names the saint) and to accuse him of drowsiness and to boast himself more vigilant and acute in those disputations. Who could tolerate him saying such things without nausea? Although like a serpent he escapes and easily slips from hands: so that if someone finds him rash, he can hardly be convicted and branded of heresy. The Church of God does not need such commentators, which is accustomed to delight only in purity, candor, brightness, itself having no spot or wrinkle. I have read him, I say, and have noted fifty and more positions, words, phrases, which are at least related to the errors of the

Pelagians or Semipelagians (although he more cautiously contains himself within the limits of Catholic faith, or at least by protesting), nor do I think that anyone who has read those things without private affection will deny it entirely. Why does the Church of God need Molina's books to learn what it has already learned from so many Holy Fathers, Councils, and decrees for so many centuries? As concerns our Lord Pope Clement himself, this is his purpose, this his vow, this finally his decree, that he not depart a nail's breadth from the footsteps of his predecessors, but stand on them most firmly. He knows clearly that so many holy Pontiffs Innocent, Sixtus, Celestine, Hormisdas, and finally Felix (whose are the Canons of the Council of Orange) professed in their writings and testified that the Roman Church in those things which regard grace and free will has always been accustomed to follow Saint Augustine. Hormisdas indeed testifies this in so many words in his letters, so much so that no other judgment is needed, since it has already been prejudged. He labors now in examining Molina's volume, concerning which, whether rejecting or purging or retaining, the lawsuit is still under judgment. In my opinion indeed, the Catholic Church does not need that in which at least certain things harsh to the ear would have to be corrected. I warn my most Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus not to allow their reputation to be endangered in defending his books and to be brought into danger. I honor them all, God knows, as Fathers, so that I might use that about them: "The reproaches of those reproaching you have fallen upon me." But I do not want to be more prolix. Farewell most loving and most learned Father, lamp to my feet, when it happens to walk through dark places. Concerning Blessed men to be placed in the number of Saints, God has reserved this for another time. Rome, Ides of March, year of the Lord 1603.

Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lordship's Brother and Servant Caesar  
Cardinal Baronius.

Peter Mathieu makes mention of this letter in "History of Seven Years of Peace" Volume Second Book Seventh, Fourth Narration, which he says he saw, and relates a fragment of the same, namely these words: "I warn my most Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus," etc.

## § XI.

*An efficacious decree and God's previous concurrence, or predetermining, must be admitted for both states of fallen and innocent nature.*

This is proved first from the principles established above: for in both those states the nature and dignity of first and most universal cause must be preserved in God. But this, with the predetermining decree and God's previous concurrence removed, cannot stand: Therefore for both states of fallen and innocent nature, the predetermining

decree and previous concurrence, or physical predetermination, must be admitted. The major is certain from faith. The minor is clear from what was said above; since an indifferent decree awaits determination from free will, it cannot cause it, hence if God for the state of innocence had a purely indifferent decree and only simultaneous concurrence, he was not the cause of the free determination of the will of Adam and the Angels, nor consequently of the discretion of good Angels from evil; and such discretion must be reduced not to God but to free will, and not to grace but to nature.

This is confirmed: Second causes, in whatever state they are placed, must be subordinated to God as first cause in operating. But the subordination of second causes to the first in operating cannot be preserved without God's previous concurrence and physical predetermination, as was shown in § 3: Therefore such concurrence and predetermination must be admitted for whatever state of human nature. Hence St. Thomas everywhere and constantly demands the necessity of divine premotion not only because of the weakness of our wounded nature, but also because of the indispensable dependence and subordination of any second cause on the first in acting, as is clear from the first part of the second part question 109 article 1, where he says: "It is manifest that just as all bodily motions are reduced to the motion of a celestial body as to the first bodily mover, so all motions, both bodily and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover simply, which is God. And therefore, however perfect any bodily or spiritual nature is posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless moved by God." Hence in the following article in response ad 1 he asserts that the mind of man, even when healthy, does not so have dominion over its act that it does not need to be moved by God.

This is proved secondly from the principles established in the treatise on God's knowledge: for there we showed that God's knowledge is the cause of things, and that God contemplates all things in himself as cause and medium first known, and consequently knows absolute and conditional futures in his essence through absolute or conditional decree determined by it, and thus there is not in God knowledge which is the condition of conditional futures independent of conditional decree and prior to it: But these things cannot stand if a purely indifferent decree is admitted for the state of innocence; for it cannot be the medium of certainly and infallibly knowing futures whether absolute or conditional, since in an indifferent cause, as it is indifferent, a determinate effect cannot be certainly and infallibly known: hence, with the predetermining decree removed for the state of innocence, God will have to know all futures whether absolute or conditional pertaining to that state immediately in themselves and in their objective truth, and consequently middle knowledge will have to be admitted in God for such a state, which directs God in his indifferent decrees and explores the future consent of the created will of Adam and the Angels. Likewise God's knowledge for such a state will not be the cause of the futurity of things, nor

their rule and measure, but rather will be ruled and measured by them as to truth and certainty, which is entirely alien from the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as was shown in the same treatise. Hence a certain recent author rightly says that those who restrict the efficacy of divine decrees to the state of fallen nature scatter with the left hand the stones of the Augustinian wall which they compose with the right.

Moreover, because Jansen evokes this cause to Augustine's tribunal and contends that this lawsuit should be settled by Augustine's testimonies alone, many testimonies of this Holy Doctor which openly favor our opinion must be briefly examined here, so that from them it may be clear how false is what the aforesaid Author says in book 8 "On the Grace of Christ the Savior," that efficacious grace and physical predetermination extended to all states of human nature is most remote from Augustine's senses and can be proved by no testimony.

Augustine therefore clearly expressed the necessity and efficacy of divine motion for every state and for all causes both necessary and free in book 3 "On the Trinity" chapter 4 with these words: "God's will is the first and supreme cause of all bodily species and motions." He has the same in tract 1 on John explaining those words "All things were made through him." And in Prosper sentence 58 saying: "The divine will is the cause of all bodily and spiritual motions." Where it is clear that the Holy Doctor speaks not only of bodily causes but also of spiritual motions. Hence in book 5 "On Genesis to the Letter" he says universally: "God therefore moves by hidden power the entire creation." And in the book "On Grace and Free Will" chapter 20, speaking specifically of the free motion of the will, he writes: "If divine Scripture is diligently inspected, it shows that not only the good wills of men, which he makes from evil and when made good by himself directs to good acts and eternal life, but even those which preserve the creature of the world, are so in God's power that he makes them incline where he wills, when he wills." And in chapter 21 he continues: "The Omnipotent acts in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, so that through them he acts whatever he wills to act, who entirely knows not how to will anything unjustly." Which he confirms in the book "On Correction and Grace" chapter 14 with the example of the election of Saul, which he says proceeded from God's most omnipotent power of inclining human hearts where he wills. He also confirms with the example of those who elected David as King: "Whom," he says, "God led so that they would constitute a King. And how did he lead? Did he bind them with bodily chains? He acted within, held hearts, moved hearts, and drew them by their wills which he himself worked in them." The reason for all of which he deduced not from the corruption of their heart but from supreme dominion over our wills, saying: "When God wills to constitute Kings on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own." All of which things are so clear and expressed for establishing the necessity and efficacy of God's general motion that nothing clearer

and more expressed can be brought forward, unless perhaps this which the same Holy Doctor has in book "Against Two Letters of the Pelagians" chapter 20, where speaking of the change of King Ahasuerus from indignation to gentleness (which was an act of natural order) he says that God converted the King's heart by most hidden and efficacious power, transferred it from indignation to leniency. Therefore according to Augustine, God's efficacious motion, preventing our wills, is required not only for supernatural acts but also for operations of natural order, and consequently must be admitted for whatever state of human nature.

To make this more evident and so it cannot be eluded by any tergiversation, other testimonies must be brought forward in which the same Holy Doctor, descending to the state of integrity of Angels and our first parents, declares that efficacious grace was necessary in them. For in the treatise "On the New Canticle" chapter 8 he says: "What free will not aided can do was demonstrated in Adam himself": Therefore he thinks efficacious aid for not sinning was denied to him. Hence in sermon 11 "On the Words of the Apostle," speaking of the same Adam, he adds: "Falling from the hand of the potter he was broken, for he who had made him was ruling him": but rule denotes a certain preventing and applying motion, not purely sufficient aid determinable and applicable by free will. Likewise in 11 "City of God" chapter 19 he teaches that the discretion of good and evil Angels was from God, not from free will: "For God alone could discern them." Hence he refers to them that of the Apostle: "What do you have that you did not receive?" But the discretion of good and evil Angels could not proceed from sufficient grace common to both and determinable by them as to consent or dissent: Therefore it must have been from efficacious grace predetermining free will to consent. Jansen himself often uses this argument against those who deny efficacious and predetermining grace in the state of fallen nature. I add that in book 12 chapter 9, speaking of the good will by which good Angels through love adhered to God, he says it proceeded from the aid of grace, and consequently thinks it was efficacious of itself. "If they could not make themselves better than he had made them, certainly they could not have good will by which they would be better except with the Creator's aid working," etc. Finally there is the celebrated place of the same book where he asserts that with evil Angels falling by evil will, the good ones were aided more to arrive at that fullness of beatitude from which they would never fall, being most certain. Where Augustine manifestly admits greater aid and more help in good Angels who persevered than in those who fell into fault; which more aid cannot be except efficacious grace, since all had abundantly received sufficient.

Nor does Jansen's response avail, asserting that the greater aid which Augustine says was conferred on good Angels and denied to evil ones is not the gift of perseverance itself or efficacious aid for persevering, but only the greater aid which they received

from God in beatitude itself, namely certain knowledge by which already blessed they knew they would never fall. For this evasion openly contradicts the text, since Augustine says that good Angels were aided more to arrive at beatitude, not that where they arrived at beatitude they were more aided. Hence Estius in 1 distinction 41 § 13: "If this aid by which blessed Angels are said to be more aided were beatitude itself, the sense would be rendered inept: namely that beatitude was conferred on Angels by which they would arrive at beatitude."

Nevertheless Jansenius objects many testimonies of Augustine against our opinion. The principal and as it were paramount one is that which is taken from chapters 11 and 12 of the book "On Correction and Grace," where the Holy Doctor distinguishes a double aid: one which he calls aid "without which" [sine quo], another which he calls aid "by which" [quo] (that is, sufficient and efficacious aid), and teaches that the first was conceded to Adam in the state of innocence, but not the second, which is conferred on the saints and predestined in the state of fallen nature and repaired by grace.

The common response is that Augustine there does not speak of any grace of the state of innocence, but only of that which was conceded to Adam for persevering in that state and in that integrity which he received from God in his creation, which grace was not aid "by which" one perseveres, or efficacious, but aid "without which" we cannot persevere, or sufficient. Thus St. Thomas, his most faithful disciple, interprets Augustine in 1-2 question 109 article 10 ad 3: "It must be said that as Augustine says in the book 'On Correction and Grace': man in the first state received the gift by which he could persevere, but he did not receive that he would persevere. Now however through Christ's grace, many receive both the gift of grace by which they can persevere, and further it is given to them that they persevere, and thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault." And certainly Augustine clearly explains himself there in chapter 22, where after he explained that double kind of aid, he adds: "Therefore to the first man, who had been made upright in that good, who had received to be able not to sin, to be able not to abandon that good itself, aid of perseverance was given, not by which it would be brought about that he persevere, but without which free will could not persevere. Now however to the Saints predestined to God's kingdom by God's grace, not only is such aid of perseverance given, but such that perseverance itself is given to them: not only that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but truly that through this gift they are nothing but persevering." From which it is clear that the Holy Doctor there speaks of aid "without which" for persevering.

But although this interpretation is legitimate and according to Augustine's mind, it nevertheless does not seem to evacuate the present difficulty; because other testimonies of the same Holy Doctor can be brought forward, taken from that double

chapter of the same book "On Correction and Grace," by which he manifestly seems to exclude all efficacious grace from the state of innocence and admit only sufficient, subjected to the free will of Adam and the Angels as to efficacy and use. For there he teaches that Adam stood in truth by will and free will. That he could have remained in justice if he had willed. That God left it to his will that he should will to persevere. Likewise there he says that with evil Angels falling through free will, good ones stood through the same free will, which was so free that it could will well and ill. Finally he asserts that God so ordered the life of Angels and men that in it he would first show what free will could do, then what the benefit of grace and the judgment of justice could do.

To these and similar testimonies a double response can be applied. The first is that St. Augustine in these places did not want to exclude efficacious grace absolutely and under any aspect from the state of innocence, but only efficacious grace insofar as it is healing and medicinal, under which aspect and formality it is required in fallen man, namely to heal the wounds inflicted on him by original sin. Hence only to that extent does Augustine teach that Adam stood in truth by will and free will; that he could have remained in justice if he had willed; that God left it to his will that he should will to persevere, and similar things; insofar as he felt no weakness of will or repugnance of inferior appetite and suffered no difficulty in acting which should be overcome by Christ's medicinal grace, and the same must be said proportionally of the Angels. Thus St. Thomas interprets Augustine in 2-2 question 137 article 3 ad 2, where he says: "Augustine says in the book 'On Correction and Grace' that it was given to the first man not that he persevere, but that he could persevere, through free will, because there was no corruption then which would provide difficulty of persevering." Estius expounds him in the same way in 1 distinction 41 § 14, who also adds that unless we receive this understanding of Augustine's words insinuated by St. Thomas, it will be most difficult, and not even possible, to reconcile Augustine to himself: that is, to show how those things which were objected do not contradict those which were previously brought forward from the same Augustine. Namely that good will by which Angels adhered to the Creator was God's work, and that they could not have it except with the Creator's aid working. That good Angels, in order to arrive at beatitude, were more aided than evil ones who defected from it. That the discretion of good and evil Angels was from God, not from free will, and consequently not from nature but from grace, and other such things which openly declare the efficacy and operation of divine grace in Angels and first parents.

The second response of a certain recent Thomist, which nearly coincides with the preceding, is that Augustine compares grace per se necessary for either state, of health or corruption, from the proper merits, so to speak, of either state, and attending to the condition of healthy and sick man. For in this sense it is true that although fallen and

sick man, because of the perpetual struggle of rebellious concupiscence, needs most invincible aid lest among so many and such great temptations his weak will itself succumb; nevertheless in the state of innocence, healthy and integral, he did not per se need such aid, but from the force of that state demanded only sufficient grace, although from elsewhere (from the general subordination of second cause to first) he needed efficacious motion and previous concurrence, as Augustine teaches in the places related above by us, where he admits the necessity of divine motion not only for supernatural acts but also for natural ones, and consequently from the force of the subordination of second causes to the first.